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Navigational collisions are one of the major safety concerns for many seaports. 
Traditionally port water collision risks are modeled using historical collision data. In 
most cases, this approach of modeling is hampered because of low number of 
observations. It is also an unethical and reactive safety management approach because 
of its reliance on collision data. 
 
To overcome the problems, this research explores the use of non-collision data in 
collision risk modeling. Traffic conflicts are innovatively proposed as an alternative to 
the collisions and use of the conflicts in risk modeling is explored by developing 
mathematical models for measuring and predicting the risks. A risk measurement 
model is developed that quantitatively measures collision risk in individual 
interactions, statistically characterizes the risks collectively and obtains risk of 
collision in waterways by identifying the interactions with high potential of collision. 
Validity of the model is assessed by evaluating correlations between the measured 
risks and those perceived by pilots. For prediction of risks, a binomial logistic model 
with considerations for hierarchical data structure is formulated. The model explains 
the relationships between the risks and waterway characteristics by accounting for the 
correlations in risks at different time periods in a waterway. 
 
The proposed traffic-conflict-based modeling technique is illustrated for Singapore 
port waterways. Examining the validity of the models, this research proves that 
collision risk can be evaluated in a fast, reliable and proactive manner by using traffic 
conflicts. 
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1.1 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1.1 COLLISION RISK IN PORT WATERS 
 
Navigational safety is among the top-priority concerns in worldwide maritime 
developments and research, because it is coupled with shipping efficiency, distribution 
reliability, port operations, and loss prevention. Maritime governing bodies around the 
world have repeatedly recognized the assessment and management of safety in 
maritime transportation as an important problem (Goossens and Glansdorp, 1998; 
NRC, 1986, 1991, 1994, 2000; Pietrzykowski, 2008; Yip, 2008). Concerns for 
navigational safety have been increasing over time, because shipping traffic has been 
increasing rapidly over the past decades in order to meet the increasing demand of 
waterborne transport (Soares and Teixeira, 2001). 
 
Since often cargoes contain hazardous materials, safe navigation is a prime requisite. A 
navigational accident can be catastrophic posing serious threats to life, property and 
environment. A survey on navigational accidents (IMO, 2005) revealed that 589 ships 
and 101 lives had been lost in the year 2004. Another study (Roberts and Marlow, 
2005) have shown that the fatal accident rate in British merchant shipping between 
1976 and 2002 was 27.8 times higher than in the general workplace in Britain. 
Carpenter (1988) further reported that a navigational accident approximately costs 
USD 545,000 on an average. In case of the accidents producing oil/chemical spillage, 
the consequences could be much higher. For example, a collision between two ships in 
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Singapore waters (MPA, 1997) resulted in a spill of 28,500 tonnes of heavy marine 
fuel oil, which involved about 650 personnel and 80 crafts for a 3 weeks time period to 
clean up. The threats related to the consequences of navigational accidents inevitably 
imply that ensuring safety in navigation is a concomitant necessity. 
 
Risk of a navigational accident can be higher in port waters, compared to open sea, 
because of dense traffic movements, relatively insufficient sea-room and restricted 
depth of water in port waters (Akten, 2004). Consequently, the consequences of 
accidents can also be higher in such waters. It has been shown that navigational 
accidents occur mostly in or near port territorial waters (C.-P. Liu et al., 2006) and 
more importantly, frequency of accidents in port areas is increasing over time (Darbra 
and Casal, 2004). Therefore, for efficient operation of ports, maintaining smooth and 
safe traffic movement along port waterways is necessary. 
 
Navigational collisions are one of the major safety concerns for many ports. Collisions 
account for a substantial portion of major shipping accidents in port waters, as reported 
in many studies (Akten, 2004; Darbra and Casal, 2004; Goossens and Glansdorp, 
1998; C.-P. Liu et al., 2006; Q. Liu et al., 2006; Yip, 2008). Collisions are also 
identified as one of the most severe types of accidents (IMO, 1998). Furthermore, the 
increasing growth of world fleet (Soares and Teixeira, 2001) is likely to result in 
increased traffic movements within port waters, which in turn could increase risk of 
collision in these congested and restricted waters. The number of traffic movements on 
a busy fairway in port waters can be as high as 2000 per day (Yip, 2008) and the 
number is expected to be increasing with the continuing growth of navigational traffic. 
Such a high number of movements may result in more conflicts and collisions. More 
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importantly, navigational traffic is increasing in size (Faulkner, 2003) resulting in 
higher number of large ships in port waters. The larger ships have reduced 
maneuverability and thus face consequent increase in risk of collision, especially in the 
restricted waters (Akten, 2004). This continually increasing safety concern warrants a 
comprehensive risk modeling method to ensure safe and collision-free traffic 
movements in port waters. 
 
1.1.2 PROBLEMS IN EXISTING METHODS OF RISK MODELING 
 
To model navigational collision risk, researchers and safety analysts have utilized a 
number of methods, which can be broadly categorized into three types: qualitative, 
semi-quantitative and quantitative. In general, the qualitative methods are easiest to 
apply and least resource demanding but provide the least degree of insight. In contrast, 
the quantitative methods are most demanding on resources and skills, but potentially 
deliver the most detailed understanding. The semi-quantitative methods lie in between 
these extremes. 
 
The commonly used qualitative methods are the Hazard Identification (HAZID) 
technique and the risk matrix method. In a HAZID application, the hazards associated 
with a collision event are identified in a structured process by employing expert 
judgment (Molland, 2008). Its functionality is often extended for qualitative evaluation 
of the identified hazards’ significance by employing a risk matrix, which expresses the 
categorized likelihoods and consequences of the hazards in different dimensions (see 
DS, 1996; IMO, 1997; ISO, 1999; Trbojevic and Carr, 2000).  
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While a risk matrix is easy to apply and understand, it suffers from several limitations. 
Firstly, it is difficult to explain a collision that produces multiple consequences within 
a particular category of consequence. Secondly, inconsistency among the judgments of 
different experts may lead to biased results. Thirdly, categorization of the likelihood 
and consequence is often non-transparent because of qualitative definitions of the 
categories. This may further increase the inconsistency among experts’ judgments. 
Finally, since an important requirement of the HAZID process is to have experience of 
analyzing collisions in order to capture the lessons learnt in identifying the hazards 
(Veritas, 2001), the qualitative risk modeling methods may face difficulty in dealing 
with novel safety hazards. 
 
Semi-quantitative methods produce qualitative results by employing techniques of 
quantitative modeling or produce quantitative results by using techniques of qualitative 
modeling. Several techniques which are primarily used for quantitative risk modeling, 
such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Bow Tie, are 
employed for qualitative risk modeling (see Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). In this 
approach, the generation process of a safety hazard is evaluated by employing expert 
judgment. This arrangement of safety analysis may be useful for evaluating hazards 
where quantification is not possible or undesirable. Sometimes, the techniques of 
qualitative modeling (i.e., HAZID, risk matrix) are employed to obtain some form of 
quantification in results. The Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) (Wang, 2001) process 
of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) employs the HAZID and risk matrix 
method for quantitative modeling of risk. Several studies (e.g., Hu et al., 2007; Wang, 
2002) have employed this method, where the categories of likelihood and consequence 
in a risk matrix are defined quantitatively by using numerical indices in order to obtain 
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an estimate of risk for a particular hazard. However, this approach suffers from some 
of the limitations of the qualitative methods, such as biased judgments of different 
experts and difficulties in dealing with multiple consequences and novel hazards.  
 
The qualitative and semi-quantitative methods might be useful for some preliminary 
safety investigation purposes, but to attain a higher degree of insight researchers 
employ a quantitative method. Traditionally, similar to the qualitative and semi-
quantitative methods, the quantitative methods have relied on navigational collision 
data. A number of studies have employed collision data to examine trends and causes 
of collisions (Akten, 2004; Darbra and Casal, 2004; Hashemi et al., 1995; Le Blanc et 
al., 2001; Le Blanc and Rucks, 1996; C.-P. Liu et al., 2006; Yip, 2008), whereas some 
have examined consequences (i.e., injuries and fatalities) by using these data (Darbra 
and Casal, 2004; Talley, 2002; Talley et al., 2005, 2006, 2008; Yip, 2008). Some 
studies (Degré, 2003; MARIN, 2009; Roeleven et al., 1995) have also focused on 
modeling probability and predicting frequency of collision by utilizing such data. 
 
While modeling based on collision data may provide a detailed understanding of 
collision risk, this ‘collision-data-based approach’ is often hampered by several 
limitations. Firstly, to obtain statistically sound inferences from analysis of collision 
records it is necessary to have a database of sufficiently large number of collisions. 
Since a long time period is required to obtain such a database, this approach is not 
suitable for short-term safety assessment, where, for example, there is a need to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a particular type of safety measure at a specific location. 
Moreover, in case of evaluating safety in a particular location, the sample size (i.e., 
number of collisions in that location) becomes even smaller, thus it becomes more 
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difficult to obtain statistical soundness in results. This may explain why statistical 
significances are not reported in many studies (e.g., Darbra and Casal, 2004; C.-P. Liu 
et al., 2006). The low sample problem also often restricts safety analysts from using 
robust statistical methods, such as regression techniques. Secondly, collision is an 
outcome of a complex process of interaction involving vessels, pilots, crews, port 
operators and marine environment. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to investigate 
the main causes of collisions just from the numbers of the outcome (i.e., collision) of 
the process as collision records often omit details of the pre-collision process. Finally, 
this approach of safety analysis is reactive and unethical as it requires sufficiently large 
number of collisions to take place first, before any preventive or corrective measures 
are taken. This is particularly true for a new or upgraded traffic infrastructure where 
historical collision data are unavailable. 
 
The problems stemming from the collision-data-based approach have prompted the 
need for an alternative approach of collision risk modeling. This need motivates this 
research to call for a better approach that would not rely on collision data for modeling 
collision risk in port waters. 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
 
1.2.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The objective of this research is to explore the use of non-collision information in 
modeling collision risk in port waters. 
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1.2.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
To achieve the above objective, a measure of collision risk is proposed as an 
alternative to the historical collision data. This is achieved by critically reviewing the 
existing techniques of collision risk modeling. In particular, the advantages and 
disadvantages of the techniques are identified which leads to obtaining traffic conflicts 
as an alternative to the collisions. By using the conflicts, a systematic method for 
modeling the risks is developed. Following the two aspects of risk modeling (i.e., 
measuring the level of risk and understanding the characteristics of the risk) two 
models, namely the Risk measurement model and the Risk prediction model, are 
developed. 
 
The risk measurement model measures collision risk in a waterway by analyzing 
critical traffic interactions. To obtain a quantitative estimate of risk, this model 
quantitatively measures risks of collision in individual interactions, statistically 
characterizes the measured risks in all interactions in a waterway and obtains risk of 
collision in a waterway by identifying the interactions with high potential of collision. 
Validity of the model is assessed by evaluating correlations between the risks 
measured by the model and those perceived by pilots. 
 
The risk prediction model explains the relationships between the risks and the 
geometric, traffic and regulatory control characteristics of waterways. A systematic 
method of model formulation, calibration and validation is developed for this purpose. 
By taking the risks measured by the conflict model as input to this model, a binomial 
logistic regression model with considerations for hierarchical data structure is 
formulated, calibrated and validated through this method. 
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The modeling techniques are illustrated using traffic movement data of the different 
types of waterways (i.e., fairways, anchorages and intersections) in Singapore port.  
 
1.2.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Successful development of the non-collision-data-based modeling approach would 
provide more insights into understanding and managing port water collision risks in a 
proactive manner. It would provide navigational safety analysts an ethically appealing 
alternative to the traditional collision-data-based approach for fast, reliable and 
effective safety evaluation. A better understanding of the relationships between 
collision risks and waterway characteristics may offer new possibilities for 
unprecedented rapid safety evaluation. Being innovative in the concepts of the risk 
modeling approach, its successful development would be a breakthrough in the 
discipline of navigational safety research. 
 
1.2.4 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
While the proposed techniques of risk measurement and prediction modeling could be 
applied to all waterway types in any ports, in this research the techniques are illustrated 
for the waterways of Singapore port. For this purpose, traffic movement data of four 
hour time periods at day and night are sampled which are supposed to be 
representative of navigational conditions at day and night respectively. Since the 
calibrated models may have some embedded port-specific effects, it is advisable to 
check the transferability of the models before applying to waterways of other ports. 
However, the modeling techniques developed in this research should be easily applied 
to calibrate similar models in other ports. 
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1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 




Figure 1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
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Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the existing techniques of collision risk 
modeling in order to search for an alternative approach of risk modeling. In particular, 
the advantages and disadvantages of the existing models are identified which leads to 
obtaining the Traffic Conflict Technique as an alternative approach to the existing 
models. The concepts and underlying theory of this technique are reviewed. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology of the thesis consisting of the two models 
proposed. The formulation and validation procedures of a risk measurement model are 
discussed first. This is followed by a description of the formulation, calibration and 
validation procedure of a risk prediction model. 
 
Chapter 4 illustrates the proposed risk measurement model using traffic movement 
data of Singapore port. In addition, this chapter examines the validity of the model. 
 
Chapter 5 describes an illustrative example of the risk prediction modeling technique 
for waterways in Singapore port. 
 
Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions derived from this research. Significance 
of this research and directions for future research are also discussed. 
 
 






Traditionally, navigational collision risk modeling relies on expert judgments and 
historical collision data. Expert judgments are used for preliminary safety investigation 
purposes where collision data are not available or an in-depth safety analysis is not 
required. On the other hand, collision data are widely used to assess the level of risk 
and to investigate the causes and trends of collisions. However, these approaches of 
collision risk modeling suffer from several limitations. Modeling risk using expert 
judgments is often hindered by inconsistency among different expert’s judgments. Risk 
modeling based on collision data is also often hampered by low number of 
observations, insufficiency in explaining collision causation and its reactive approach 
to safety. A promising alternative approach that could overcome these problems is the 
Traffic Conflict Technique (TCT), which relies on observations of critical traffic 
interactions as a surrogate of collisions. The TCT was primarily developed in the 
context of road traffic safety modeling and has been employed in an impressive 
number of studies to develop and refine its concepts, measurement methods, validity, 
and application issues. However, the TCT approach is yet to be implemented for 
modeling collision risks in port waters.  
 
This chapter aims to provide a critical review of the traditional techniques of modeling 
collision risk in order to identify the advantages and limitations of the models. In 
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addition, the concepts and underlying theories of the TCT are discussed to examine its 
potentiality to overcome the limitations of the existing models. 
 
2.2 MODELS OF COLLISION RISK 
 
Safety in port water navigation is coupled with safety in port operations, offshore 
installations, and general loss prevention. For this reason, many of the navigational 
safety models are developed to have general applicability to any safety hazards in 
maritime domain. Efforts have also been devoted to develop models for analyzing 
specific safety problems, such as collision risk in port waters. 
 
Safety models, which are applicable to port water collision risk modeling, are of two 
types: online models, and offline models. The online models deal with real-time traffic 
information for modeling collision avoidance in navigation. On the other hand, the 
offline models concern address issues related to modeling of collision risks using 
historical data (e.g., historical collision data) and expert judgments. 
 
The online models have focused on different aspects of collision avoidance, such as 
development of collision avoidance systems (e.g., Chin and Debnath, 2009; Q. Liu et 
al., 2006), improvement on plotting performance of Automatic Radar Plotting Aid 
(ARPA) (e.g., Pedersen et al., 1999; Sato and Ishii, 1998), development of cone-
shaped danger regions (Lenart, 1983), evaluation of display techniques (Pedersen et 
al., 2002a), evaluation of anti-collision maneuvers in collision avoidance systems (e.g., 
Kwik, 1989; Pedersen and Jacobsen, 2002; Pedersen et al., 2002b, 2003), application 
of kinetic Voronoi diagram in collision avoidance (Goralski et al., 2007), use of 
Automatic Identification System and VHF in collision avoidance (e.g., Harati-
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Mokhtari, 2007; Harding, 2002; Harre, 1999; Norris, 2007; Pratt and Taylor, 2004; 
Stitt, 2003) and incorporation of collision avoidance capability in Vessel Traffic 
Service (Kao et al., 2007). A comprehensive review of the concepts, technologies and 
techniques of autonomous ship collision avoidance can be found in Statheros et al.  
(2008). Since the objective of this research is related to the offline models, the online 
models are not discussed in detail in this thesis. 
 
The traditional offline models can be broadly categorized into three types – qualitative, 
semi-quantitative and quantitative models. In general, the qualitative models are 
easiest to apply and demands least resource, but provide the least degree of insight. In 
contrast, the quantitative models are most demanding on resources and skills, but 
potentially deliver the most in-depth understanding. The semi-quantitative models lie 
in between these extremes. These three types of safety models are discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
 
2.1.1 QUALITATIVE MODELS 
 
Qualitative safety models are used to identify possible hazards, to evaluate their 
significances, and to identify the measures for reducing the frequencies or 
consequences of the hazards. The commonly used models for a qualitative analysis 
include the Hazard Identification (HAZID) technique and the risk matrix method, 
which are discussed in this section. 
 
HAZID is a structured process of identifying the hazards associated with a collision 
event (Molland, 2008). It involves a group of experts, who identifies the possible 
hazards through group interactions, so that the chance of overlooking any hazards is 
National University of Singapore 13
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
reduced. Though this method does not require historical collision data as input to the 
analysis, it relies on expert judgment and experience of analyzing collisions. To 
facilitate the hazard identification process, hazard checklists (i.e., a list of issues which 
are supposed to be considered in a HAZID process) are often used. A generic hazard 
checklist can be found in CMPT (1999). 
 
To evaluate the significance of an identified hazard, risk matrices are usually 
employed. A risk matrix provides a traceable framework for explicit consideration of 
the frequency (i.e., ‘likelihood’ of the hazard occurrence) and consequence (i.e., 
‘severity’ of the hazard’s consequence) of a hazard. A typical matrix (see Figure 2.1) 
has rows representing categories of consequence severity (e.g., minor, significant, 
severe, catastrophic) and columns representing likelihood of the consequences (e.g., 
frequent, reasonable probable, remote, extremely remote). 
 
CONSEQUENCE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD 
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reducing measures) Intolerable 
 
Figure 2.1 A Typical Risk Matrix (ISO, 1997) 
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Upon identifying the hazards through a HAZID process, generally each hazard is 
qualitatively evaluated by defining different regions in a risk matrix. For example, the 
ISO risk matrix (ISO, 1999) uses three risk regions (see Trbojevic and Carr, 2000): 
• Negligible (or broadly acceptable) – a hazard in this region indicates necessity 
of managing risk for continuous improvement. 
• Intolerable – risk in this region is unacceptable. 
• Intermediate region – this region lies in between the two extremes. Risks in this 
region have to be reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable 
(HSWA, 1991). 
 
While different risk matrix approaches are developed based on the general two-way 
matrix structure, inconsistency exists among the definitions of the categories of 
likelihood and consequence. For example, the ISO risk matrix (ISO, 1999) uses five 
categories of likelihood and six categories of consequence. The Defence Standard 
matrix (DS, 1996) categorizes the likelihood in six types and the consequence in four 
types. A 7 x 4 matrix configuration (likelihood x severity) is also found in IMO (1997). 
Furthermore, specifications of the risk regions also vary among different approaches. 
While the ISO risk matrix uses three risk regions, the Defence Standard matrix uses 
four. This lack of standardization among the categories of likelihood, consequence and 
risk regions may often cause confusion in risk matrix application. 
A risk matrix is easy to apply and requires least resources and skills. However, it 
suffers from several potential limitations: 
• In a risk matrix, it is difficult to explain a hazard that produces multiple 
consequences. Since risk matrix expresses severity of consequence by a single 
category, it may consider the most severe consequence only. 
National University of Singapore 15
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
• Inconsistency among the judgments of different experts may lead to biased 
results. In general, different experts may have different judgments regarding a 
particular hazard. Furthermore, there may be variations in judgments of an 
individual expert. These variations may produce biased results. 
• Categorization of likelihood and consequence of a hazard is often non-
transparent because of qualitative definitions of the categories. This may 
further increase inconsistency among experts’ judgments. 
• It may be difficult to analyze a novel hazard by using a risk matrix. The 
HAZID process requires the experts to have past experience of analyzing 
hazards similar to the hazard in consideration so that the experts can capture the 
lessons learnt in identifying hazards (Veritas, 2001). Therefore, in case of a 
novel hazard, the HAZID and the risk matrix method becomes less useful. 
 
2.1.2 SEMI-QUANTITATIVE MODELS 
 
Semi-quantitative modeling of collision risk is achieved through two approaches: 
1. Employ techniques of qualitative modeling, but produce quantitative results. 
2. Employ techniques of quantitative modeling, but produce qualitative results. 
 
The techniques of qualitative safety modeling (e.g., HAZID, risk matrices) are often 
employed to obtain some form of quantification in results. In this approach, the 
categories of likelihood and consequence in a risk matrix are defined quantitatively by 
using numerical indices (e.g., 1 to 5). By summing up the indices, a quantitative 
estimate of risk is obtained which allows prioritizing a set of hazards. 
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An example of this approach is the Risk Ranking matrix that is proposed in a revision 
of the IMO guidelines on Formal Safety Assessment (IMO, 1997). It uses seven 
Frequency Indices (FI) and four Severity Indices (SI) to define the categories of 
likelihood and consequence respectively. Risk of a hazard is expressed as 
 
Risk Index = FI + SI (2.1) 
 
A different form of defining the FI and SI is proposed by Hu et al.(2007). In case of 
navigational accidents, they defined the FI as the ratio of the number of accidents (e.g., 
collision) to the number of shipping activities per unit time. The SI is defined as the 
ratio of the consequences to the number of accidents per unit time. It is obvious from 
the definitions that historical collision data are necessary to obtain the indices. 
 
Due to incorporation of a risk matrix the Risk Ranking matrix approach suffers from 
some of the limitations of the qualitative modeling approach, such as biased judgments 
of different experts and difficulties in dealing with multiple consequences and novel 
hazards. While Hu et al. (2007) shows that a quantitative estimate of risk can be 
obtained by employing historical collision data instead of using expert judgments, this 
approach still suffers from the limitations of a risk matrix. Furthermore, safety analysis 
using collision data is often hampered by a number of drawbacks, which are discussed 
elaborately in Section 2.1.3. 
 
The other semi-quantitative safety models employ techniques of quantitative modeling, 
such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Bow Tie, but do 
not actually quantify the estimate of risk. The FTA and ETA are used for analyzing the 
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‘likelihood’ and ‘consequence’ of a hazard, whereas a Bow Tie combines the two (see 




Figure 2.2 A Typical Fault Tree (Molland, 2008) 
 
A FTA is a logical representation of a number of events and component failures that 
may contribute to cause one critical event, such as a collision. It is commonly used to 
quantify the likelihood of a critical event based on estimates of the failure rates of each 
component. A typical fault tree is shown in Figure 2.2. On the other hand, an ETA 
represents a number of events (consequences) that may result from an initiating event 
(component failure). As presented in Figure 2.3, it quantitatively estimates the 
probability of outcomes by using probabilities of preceding outcomes and the 
originating event. A comprehensive review of FTA and ETA, their applications, 
advantages and disadvantages can be found in Kristiansen (2005).  
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Figure 2.3 A Typical Event Tree of Ship-Ship Collision (Ronza et al., 2003) 
 
While the FTA and ETA are usually used to quantify the probabilities of events and 
consequences, in semi-quantitative modeling they are employed to formulate the 
structure of the tree only. A team of experts identify the process of hazard generation 
and judge the adequacy of appropriate safety measures except quantifying the 
probabilities on the branches of the tree. This approach of safety modeling is useful for 
evaluating hazards where quantification is not possible or undesirable. 
 
2.1.3 QUANTITATIVE MODELS 
 
The qualitative and semi-quantitative models might be useful for some preliminary 
safety investigation purposes, but to attain a higher degree of insight a quantitative 
model is required. Quantitative models force all assumptions to be explicit and hence 
provide a better understanding of uncertainty than the models solely relying on expert 
judgments. 
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Traditionally, quantitative modeling of collision risk has relied on collision data. A 
number of studies have employed collision data to examine trends and causes of 
collisions (Akten, 2004; Darbra and Casal, 2004; Hashemi et al., 1995; Le Blanc et al., 
2001; Le Blanc and Rucks, 1996; C.-P. Liu et al., 2006; Yip, 2008) whereas some have 
examined consequences (i.e., injuries and fatalities) by using the statistics (Darbra and 
Casal, 2004; Talley, 2002; Talley et al., 2005, 2006, 2008; Yip, 2008). Some studies 
(Degré, 2003; MARIN, 2009; Roeleven et al., 1995) have also focused on modeling 
probability and predicting frequency of collision by utilizing collision data. The studies 
are further discussed in detail in this section. 
 
To analyze collision records, a number of mathematical tools have been employed, 
such as statistical models, FTA, and ETA. Among these tools, the statistical models are 
most commonly used which can be broadly categorized into two types: Descriptive 
models and Regression models. Collision risk modeling in view of these two types of 
models is discussed in the succeeding sections. 
 
2.1.3.1 Descriptive Models 
 
Statistics of collision frequency and casualties involved often used to represent the 
overall level of safety in port waters. A descriptive analysis of the statistics provides a 
simple and quick assessment of prevailed collision risk. To identify the level of risk, 
researchers used different indicators to represent frequency and consequences of 
collision records, such as 
• Collision frequency: Number and percentage of collisions 
• Collision consequences: Number and degree of injury and fatality, Injury and 
fatality rates, Degree of ship/cargo /property damage. 
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of Accidents (MHIDAS database) as a Function of Time 
(Darbra and Casal, 2004) 
 
Darbra and Casal (2004) conducted a study on 471 accidents occurring in seaports in 
1941 – 2002, which were obtained from the Major Hazard Incident Data Service 
(MHIDAS) (MHIDAS, 2002). They found that the number of accidents has increased 
spectacularly in recent decades (83% of the accidents have taken place in 1983 – 
2002), as shown in Figure 2.4. Based on an observed increasing trend of accident 
occurrence and the notable growth in shipping traffic, they argued that the frequency 
of accidents in port areas will be increasing considerably in the next years. This study 
also showed that 56.5% of all accidents occurred during transport (i.e., involves 
moving ships), 65% involve an ocean going vessel (i.e., merchant vessels) and 26% are 
ship-ship collisions. These values imply that collision is a dominant safety hazard in 
port waters. Apart from the frequency analyses, this study examined injuries and 
fatalities resulted from the accidents by using accumulated frequency-number of 
deaths graph. They found that the probability of an accident with 10 or more deaths is 
seven times higher than that for an accident with 100 or more deaths. 
 
*
* 2 years observations only 
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In a study on the accidents in four commercial ports of Taiwan in years 1992 to 2003, 
C.-P. Liu et al. (2006) evaluated the safety levels in the ports. They reported that 23% 
of the accidents were caused by an impact (i.e., collision and contact). By analyzing 
accidents and utilizing expert judgments they identified several important navigational 
concerns, such as arbitrary anchoring of vessels, grounding and collision of heavily 
loaded vessels in complicated channels, failure to keep safe distance between 
neighboring berths, and reduced visibility of navigational aids. To mitigate the 
concerns, several strategies were suggested, such as enhancing vessel traffic 
management systems, maintenance and reinforcement of navigational aids, and 
conducting regular safety sessions among navigational personnel. 
 
Akten (2004) analyzed the navigational accidents occurred in the Bosphorus in 1953 – 
2002 and reported that 209 accidents (out of a total of 461) were collisions. The 
probability of a collision at night was found to be 2.1 times higher than that in day, 
which implies that collision occurrence is influenced by the navigational conditions at 
day and night. The other casual factors of accidents identified are dense traffic, sharp 
bends in fairways, improper conduct of vessels within Traffic Separation Scheme 
(TSS), and ships proceeding without a pilot. This study proved that TSS can be a 
significant measure of improving safety in dense and complicated fairways. 
 
In a study of accidents in Hong Kong waters, Yip (2008) also showed that collision is 
the dominant type of accident in port waters. About 54% of all accidents reported in 
2001 to 2005 were caused by collisions. Analyses of the collided vessel types revealed 
that 44% of the collisions took place between two cargo vessels. This implies that the 
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consequences of a collision in port waters could be high because of the involvement of 
the vessels loaded with cargo. 
 
Besides the above studies, some other (Hashemi et al., 1995; Le Blanc et al., 2001; Le 
Blanc and Rucks, 1996; Soares and Teixeira, 2001) also analyzed accident data 
descriptively and reported that collisions account for a substantial portion of major 
navigational accidents. Soares and Teixeria (2001) used the Lloyds World Casualty 
Statistics (LWCS) data (LWCS, 2009), whereas the others used accident database 
maintained by local authorities. Besides the descriptive statistics models, Hashemi et 
al. (1995) and Le Blanc et al. (2001) found that an artificial neural network is useful 
and accurate in predicting the type of vessel accidents that may occur under different 
combinations of navigating conditions. 
 
2.1.3.2 Regression Models 
 
While a descriptive statistics analysis uses a single variable model, a regression 
analysis uses a multi-variable model. A single variable model assumes that the effects 
of explanatory variables (if more than one) are independent of each other which would 
lead to obtaining biased effect estimates. On the other hand, a multi-variable model 
relaxes this assumption and estimates the effects of all explanatory variables together. 
For this reason, regression is often employed for a rigorous analysis. 
 
Based on purposes of analysis, the regression models used for analyzing navigational 
accidents can be broadly categorized into two types, such as (1) Accident probability 
analysis and (2) Accident consequence analysis. The former type focuses on modeling 
accident frequency (or probability of occurrence), whereas the later focuses on 
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modeling injuries and fatalities in an accident. These two types are discussed in the 
subsequent paragraphs. 
 
Accident Probability Analysis: 
Probability of accident is usually modeled as a binary variable, for example, an 
interaction between two vessels may take two possible forms: accident or no-accident. 
Binary logit/probit models are appropriate choice for modeling such a two-state 
dependent variable. The logit model uses a standard logistic distribution to explain the 
probability of accident, whereas the probit model uses a standard normal distribution. 
However, since these distributions are of similar shape, both models produce very 
similar results. 
 
Roeleven et al. (1995) developed a binary logit model for modeling probability of 
collisions in restricted waters. In this model, the dependent variable y for ith 
observation unit (i.e., an interaction) can only takes one of the two values: yi = 0 (no-
collision) or 1 (collision). A logistic transformation of )1Pr( == ii yπ  is interpreted as 
the logarithm of the odds of collision vs. no-collision. The binary logit model is 












log βX i  (2.2) 
 
Therefore, probability iπ  is solved as 
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i −=π  (2.3) 
 
where  is a vector of explanatory variables such as geometric, traffic, and situational 
factors, which are assumed to have effects on 
iX
iπ . is the effect coefficient vector of 
the explanatory variables. 
β
 
Roeleven et al. (1995) found that probability of collision is significantly influenced by 
visibility, wind speed, ratio of navigable width to the width necessary for navigation, 
and bend radius of waterway. Apart from this study, Jin et al. (2002) and Jin and 
Thunberg (2005) have also employed a binary logit model for modeling probability of 
fishing vessel accidents. 
 
Accident Consequence Analysis: 
To analyze consequences of accidents (i.e., injuries and fatalities), researchers have 
employed a wide range of regression models. Injuries and fatalities are usually 
expressed in two forms: number of injuries and fatalities in an accident (count data) 
and categories of injury severities (ordered data). To model injury severity as count 
data, the Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB) models are used. On the other hand, 
ordered logit/probit models are used for modeling ordered data. Use of these regression 
models in navigational accident analyses are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 
 
Poisson regression model has been used in modeling number of fatal and non-fatal 
injuries in ferry accidents (Talley, 2002), numbers of deaths and missing crews in 
freight ship accidents (Talley et al., 2005), number of missing crews in tugboat 
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accidents (Talley et al., 2005), numbers of injuries, deaths and missing crews in tanker 
accidents (Talley et al., 2005), and numbers of deaths and missing occupants in 
passenger vessel accidents (Talley et al., 2006).  
 
In a Poisson regression model, in order to ensure that the mean of a Poisson 
distribution (μ ) is positive, a commonly used formulation is a log-linear relationship 
between the expected numbers of injuries or fatalities in an observation unit i ( iμ ) and 
the covariates X, which is  
 
)exp()( βX iii yE ==μ  (2.4) 
 
where  is a vector of covariates which describe the characteristics of a observation 
unit   and  is a vector of regression coefficients. If  is the observed number of 
injuries or fatalities in an observation unit i, the probability of observing , when 
iX
i β iy
iy iμ  










iμμμ −=  (2.5) 
 
where iμ  is a deterministic function of and randomness in the model comes from 




The Poisson model assumes that the mean and variance of the dependent variable are 
equal. If this assumption is invalid, the standard errors will be biased and the test 
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statistics derived from the model will be incorrect. To overcome this problem of over-
dispersion, the NB regression model is employed instead of the Poisson model. 
 
The NB regression model has been used in modeling numbers of injuries and deaths in 
port water accidents (Yip, 2008), numbers of injuries in freight ship accidents (Talley 
et al., 2005), number of injuries and deaths in tugboat accidents (Talley et al., 2005), 
and number of injuries in passenger vessel accidents (Talley et al., 2006). 
 
In a NB regression model, the equality assumption between mean and variance is 
relaxed by introducing a stochastic component into the Poisson model. 
Mathematically,  
 
)exp(~ iii εμ += βX  (2.6) 
 
where ε  is a random error that is assumed to be uncorrelated with X. Hence, the 
relationship of μ~  and original μ  in Poisson model follows readily 
iii i δμεμ i)exp()exp(~ == βX . Assuming )( iE δ  equal to 1, )~( iE μ  becomes iμ , which 
imply that the expected count after adding the new source of variation is the same as it 
was for the Poisson model. 
 
Apart from the count models, researchers have employed ordered regression models to 
analyze injury severities in navigational accidents. Injury Severity (IS) may be 
described as an ordinal variable, such as no injury (IS = 0), non-fatal injury (IS = 1) 
and fatal injury (IS = 2). To model such ordinal dependent variable, ordered 
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logit/probit models are used. Talley et al. (2008) have employed such an ordered probit 
model for modeling injury severities in cruise vessel accidents. 
 
The ordered probit model is usually motivated in a latent variable framework: 
 
iiy ε+= βX i*  (2.7) 
 
Mmymy mmi    to1for        if   
*
1- =<≤= λλ   (2.8) 
 
where  represents the injury severity and can be ordered in M severity levels,  is a 
continuous latent variable,  is a vector of explanatory variables,  is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated  and 
y *y
iX β
iε  is the error term. 
 
The latent variable  ranging from *iy ∞−  to ∞+  is mapped on to an observed ordinal 
variable y . The threshold values λ ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated which 
represent the boundaries of the severity levels. The ε  is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance 1, thus the predicted probability of any type of 
injury severity,  for given  is m iX
 
( ) )()( |m Pr 1 βXβXX iii −−−== −mmi FFy λλ  (2.9) 
 
Based on this formulation, injury severity is modeled to understand the relationships 
between injury severity and different explanatory variables. 
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Limitations of collision-data-based modeling approach: 
The foregoing shows that traditionally quantitative modeling of collision risk rely 
mostly on collision data. It is natural to use collision data as measure of safety because 
of its common acceptability to researchers and practitioners. However, safety modeling 
relying on collision data is often hampered by several shortcomings, such as 
• To obtain statistically sound inferences from analysis of collision records it is 
necessary to have a database of sufficiently large number of collisions. Since a 
long time period is required to obtain such a database, this collision-data-based 
approach is not suitable for short-term safety assessment, where, for example, 
there is a need to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular type of safety 
measure at a specific location. Moreover, in case of assessing safety in a 
particular location the sample size (i.e., number of collisions in that location) 
becomes even smaller, thus it becomes more difficult to obtain statistical 
soundness in results. This may explain why statistical significances are not 
reported in many studies (e.g., Darbra and Casal, 2004; C.-P. Liu et al., 2006). 
• The low sample problem also restricts safety analysts from using robust 
statistical methods, such as regression techniques. As argued by Yip (2008), 
because of the complexity of extensive port activities, any database containing 
fewer than 1000 records might not be large enough to obtain statistically 
significant results. This might be a reason of using descriptive statistics 
analysis in many studies, instead of a rigorous regression analysis. 
• The recorded data in navigational accident databases, such as MHIDAS 
(MHIDAS, 2002) and LWCS (LWCS, 2009), are often insufficient for an in-
depth analysis (C.-P. Liu et al., 2006). Since the databases are maintained by 
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different authorities, the types of information stored also vary among them. 
This insufficiency and inconsistency problems may hinder safety analyses. 
• Collision is an outcome of a complex process of interaction involving vessels, 
pilots, crews, port operators and marine environment. Therefore, it is 
sometimes difficult to investigate the main causes of collisions just from the 
numbers of the outcome (i.e., collision) of the process as collision records often 
omit details of the pre-collision process. 
• The collision-data-based approach is also reactive and unethical as it requires 
sufficiently large number of collisions to take place first, before any preventive 
or corrective measures are taken. This is particularly true for a new or upgraded 
traffic infrastructure where historical collision data are unavailable. 
 
The shortcomings of the collision-data-based approach warrant an alternative safety 
modeling approach which will not rely on collision data. 
 
2.3 TRAFFIC CONFLICT TECHNIQUE 
 
To overcome the shortcomings of safety modeling using accident data (i.e., collision in 
case of this research), researchers have looked for indirect (or surrogate) approaches of 
safety evaluation. Traffic conflict technique (TCT) is one of the most developed 
surrogate safety modeling approach which is a systematic method of analyzing traffic 
interactions for evaluating and compensating any potential sources of safety hazards. 
The most appealing aspect of the TCT is that a larger database can be obtained within 
a shorter period of time as traffic conflicts occur considerably more frequently than 
collisions. This advantage of the TCT solves the ethical problem associated with the 
need of long collision history and facilitates obtaining statistically sound results. Thus, 
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this technique could be an ethically appealing alternative to the traditional approach of 
safety modeling using collision data.  
 
The TCT has primarily been developed in the context of road traffic safety modeling 
with a long history of development. Though highway engineers have long been using 
the idea of traffic conflicts in identifying hazardous locations on highways (Baker, 
1977), Perkins and Harris (1967) first formally stated this safety evaluation approach, 
which came to be called the TCT. The use of this technique generated immediate 
interest among safety researchers around the world who accepted this approach as 
supplement to, rather than replacement for, the traditional accident-data-based safety 
evaluation method. Increasing interest on this technique has refined its concepts and 
methods through several conferences, congresses and workshops with publications 
amounting no fewer than several hundreds. A survey on the literature on TCT (Kraay, 
1983) lists as many as two hundred references. Further, due to technological advances 
(i.e., image processing technology) in the recent decades, developments and practices 
of the TCT has grabbed considerable attention of safety researchers in recent times. 
The concepts and definitions of traffic conflicts, the issues related to measurement and 
validity, and applicability of the technique has extensively been reviewed in literature 
(see Chin and Quek, 1997; Songchitruksa and Tarko, 2006; Williams, 1981). 
 
To develop an alternative approach for modeling collision risks using non-collision 
information (e.g., traffic conflicts), it is necessary to understand the theories of TCT 
and the issues related to its application to road traffic safety modeling. A review of 
TCT is presented in this section. 
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2.3.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
In the landmark paper on TCT (Perkins and Harris, 1967), the approach adopted was to 
observe and record unsafe interactions between vehicles, determined by the use of 
evasive action to avoid a potential collision. Thus, conflicts were defined based on 
evasive actions which are readily observable in traffic stream. Chin and Quek (1997) 
argued that the insistence of regarding conflicts in terms of evasive actions may have 
resulted in a diversity of ways in defining, interpreting and identifying conflicts. They 
suggested that an exhaustive list of possible evasive actions in all traffic situations 
might be needed in order for conflict observers to understand what is to be observed. 
Although such a list was prepared in the user-manual for the US conflict technique 
(FHWA, 1989), observing the evasive actions in complicated traffic situations may be 
very difficult for observers which, in turn, may make them more prone to errors in 
conflict identification. More importantly, Chin and Quek (1997) argued that not all 
actions taken by drivers are ‘evasive’ in nature, some may be truly ‘precautionary’ as 
driving characteristics are likely to differ among drivers. 
 
The First Workshop on Traffic Conflicts (Amundsen and Hyden, 1979) proposed a 
definition which does not rely on observed evasive actions. A conflict was defined as 
“an observable situation in which two or more road users approach each other in space 
and time to such an extent that there is a risk of collision if their movements remained 
unchanged”. This definition provides a common basis of thinking, but leaves some 
ambiguity with regard to what is ‘observable’ and what is a ‘sufficient’ level of risk to 
distinguish between conflict and non-conflict situations (Chin and Quek, 1997). 
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Figure 2.5 A Safety Pyramid of Road Traffic Events (Hyden, 1977) 
 
To define conflicts more clearly, researchers proposed definitions of conflicts with 
stricter specifications. Some have defined conflicts by considering accident as a 
process preceded by conflicts which eventually has established a logical relationship 
between exposure, conflicts and accidents. Amundsen and Hyden (1979) described the 
relationship based on a set representation of traffic events (i.e., accidents are subset of 
conflicts, which are subset of a universal set of exposure), whereas some (Amundsen 
and Larsen, 1977; Baguley, 1982) represented it as an ordinal severity scale which 
ranges from slight conflicts to serious conflicts. Hyden (1977) defined the relationship 
as a safety pyramid, as shown in Figure 2.5. Another form of representation (see 
Figure 2.6), proposed by Glauz and Migletz (1980), is in the form of a frequency 
distribution of severity in terms of nearness to a collision. Although these 
representations describe the concept of TCT more clearly, still the severity levels of 
conflicts are not well-defined. 
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To define the severity levels more precisely, researchers (Guttinger, 1982; Hyden, 
1977) concentrated on the more serious conflicts by setting a threshold value. 
However, Chin and Quek (1997) criticized this approach because ignoring the 
information of slight and moderate conflicts contradicts the main intention of TCT, 





Figure 2.6 Frequency Distribution of Conflicts in terms of Nearness to Collision 
(Glauz and Migletz, 1980) 
 
The distinction between serious and non-serious conflicts has also been a subject of 
debate. Conflicts were classified into the two classes qualitatively (Spicer, 1971) as 
well as quantitatively (Chin et al., 1991; Guttinger, 1982; Hyden, 1977). Time and 
distance thresholds were employed to separate the two types of conflicts. Chin et al. 
(1991) argued that classifying conflicts based on a single threshold value is not 
reasonable. They instead suggested using a distribution of thresholds in order to 
capture the variation in driving skills (e.g., response time) among different drivers. 
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2.3.2 PAST DEVELOPMENTS AND PRACTICES 
 
The TCT has primarily been employed as a tool for diagnosing safety problems of road 
traffic systems. In particular, it has been applied to estimate the level of safety at 
intersections and roadway segments (e.g., merging area of expressway). Safety levels 
of different operating conditions (such as day and night conditions or dry or wet 
surface conditions) or different localities have also been compared by using TCT. In 
addition, TCT has often been used in evaluating before-after studies of safety 
countermeasures. 
 
For a wide range or purposes, researchers have developed and implemented the TCT, 
including research on: 
• Definitions of various types of conflicts (Amundsen and Hyden, 1979; Chin et 
al., 1991; FHWA, 2003; Parker and Zegeer, 1988; Perkins and Harris, 1967) 
• Methods for collecting conflict data (Allen et al., 1978; Chin et al., 1991; 
FHWA, 1990; Fitzpatrick, 1991) 
• Measures of conflict severity (Allen et al., 1978; Chin and Quek, 1997; Chin et 
al., 1991; FHWA, 2003; Hayward, 1972; Hyden, 1977; Minderhoud and Bovy, 
2001) 
• Establishing relationship between conflicts and accidents (FHWA, 1990; 
Migletz, 1985; Sayed and Zein, 1999; Spicer, 1971, 1973) 
• Validity of the technique (Guttinger, 1979; Hauer, 1979; Hauer and Garder, 
1986; Williams, 1981) 
 
Traffic conflicts are analyzed and interpreted in different ways. One common way that 
was used at the early stage of TCT development is using number of observed conflicts. 
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To get more insights, sometimes number of serious conflicts is also used. Spicer 
(1971) used number of conflicts to study safety at a rural dual carriageway 
intersection. In another study (Spicer, 1973), he used serious conflict counts. Conflict 
rate (conflict counts normalized by traffic volume) was also used for this purpose 
(Campbell and Ellis King, 1970). 
 
With development of the TCT, researchers focused on interpreting conflicts 
objectively. A number of quantitative measures of conflicts have been developed for 
this purpose (see Allen et al., 1978; Chin et al., 1991; FHWA, 2003; Hayward, 1972; 
Hyden, 1977). Some of the measures are discussed in the next section. Detailed 
analysis of conflicts, such as distribution and variation of the measures, was also 
achieved in some studies. Chin et al. (1991) measured risk of collision in an 
expressway merging process by considering a distribution of a quantitative measure – 
inverse of time to collision. They found that it follows a Weibull distribution. By 
identifying the serious conflicts from the tail end of the distribution, the probability of 
a near accident per merging event was computed. 
 
2.3.3 MEASUREMENT OF CONFLICTS 
 
The measurement method of traffic conflicts has been one of the major concerns in 
TCT development. A number of research efforts have been undertaken in order to 
develop methods for measuring conflicts in such a manner that the results are objective 
and repeatable based on the fact that the measurement methods in the early TCT 
studies are subjective. 
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In many of the early TCT studies, conflict measurement relies on subjective judgment 
of speed and distance by trained human observers. This subjectivity allows for 
possibility of unreliable measurement. Two aspects of unreliability in the measurement 
have been identified (Chin and Quek, 1997; Glauz and Migletz, 1980), which are 
• Intra-rater variation or consistency problem: inconsistency in recording made 
by an individual. 
• Inter-rater variation or repeatability problem: variability in interpretation and 
recording of a given situation between different observers. 
 
The inconsistencies can be attributed to a number of factors including lack of training, 
inadequate definitions of the situations to be observed, fatigue, high number of 
conflicts, and the occurrence of complex conflict types (Chin and Quek, 1997; Older 
and Spicer, 1976). To overcome some of these problems, many manuals and training 
packages have been developed which aim at detailing various types of conflicts and 
observation procedures (see Chin and Quek, 1997 for a list of studies). Researchers 
often considered video recording of traffic interactions as an alternative of on-site 
observation. This attempt opened the door for more precise quantitative measurement 
of conflicts. 
 
The reliability in conflict measurement can be improved by the use of objectively 
defined measures, for example, through measuring conflicts quantitatively. A number 
of quantitative measures, which express the severity of conflict in terms of space and 
time proximity, have been developed to measure road traffic conflicts. 
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Hayward (1972) suggested the use of Time to Collision (TTC), the time to collide with 
the leading vehicle if both vehicles continue in the same path without changing their 
speeds and directions. Chin et al. (1991) suggested the use of a reciprocal of TTC 
instead of TTC itself as the variation of the reciprocal of TTC get larger as the severity 
of conflict increases. Since the TTC can vary throughout an interaction process, 
different values of TTC at different points in an interaction process were also 
considered. The TTC at onset of breaking (also known as Time to Accident) (Hyden, 
1977) and the minimum registered value of TTC or inverse of TTC in an interaction 
process (Chin et al., 1991) are the two most commonly used measures. Minderhoud 
and Bovy (2001) have proposed two measures of conflict to consider the occurrences 
of small TTC values of all traffic participants at any moment in a specified roadway. 
Time-Exposed TTC (TET) is the duration of exposure to safety critical TTC values 
over a specified duration. Time-Integrated TTC (TIT) is the integral of the TTC profile 
of drivers involved in traffic interactions in that duration. 
 
Allen et al. (1978) proposed several measures of conflicts which include Gap time, 
Post Encroachment Time (PET), Encroachment Time (ET), Initially Attempted Post 
Encroachment Time (IAPE), Proportion of Stopping Distance (PSD) and Deceleration 
Rate (DR). Gap time is the time difference between the arrival times of the involved 
vehicles at the point of crossing if no evasive actions are taken. PET is the time lapse 
between the end of encroachment of a vehicle on a collision point and the time that the 
other vehicle actually arrives at that point. ET is defined as the time duration during 
which the turning of a vehicle infringes the right-of-way of the second vehicle. IAPE is 
the time lapse between the commencement of an encroachment by a turning vehicle 
plus the expected time for the other vehicle to reach a common conflict point, and the 
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completion time of encroachment by the turning vehicle. PSD is the ratio of the 
remaining distance to the potential point of collision and the acceptable minimum 
stopping distance. DR is the highest rate at which a vehicle must decelerate to avoid a 
collision. 
 
These quantitative measures of conflicts have widely been used for various purposes, 
such as diagnosing safety problems at intersections or roadway segments by measuring 
conflicts, comparison of safety levels between two roadway facilities, simulation of 
traffic events etc. However, research on how to measure conflicts is still ongoing so 
that the measures can fit in the purposes of TCT studies. 
 
2.3.4 VALIDITY OF TRAFFIC CONFLICT TECHNIQUE 
 
Validity of the TCT is traditionally judged by the adequacy in predicting number of 
accidents (Hauer and Garder, 1986) or by evaluating the magnitude of the correlation 
between conflict counts and accident counts (Chin and Quek, 1997). This approach of 
validation was considered particularly important in the early years of development in 
order to establish the TCT as an alternative to the accident data analysis. 
 
The idea of predicting number of accidents is often criticized by many researchers 
(e.g., Chin and Quek, 1997; Hauer, 1979). Hauer (1979) who argued that the intention 
of a safety study should be to prevent accidents rather than to predict them. Chin and 
Quek (1997) further argued that the TCT should primarily be used as a diagnostic and 
evaluative tool rather than a predictive one, thus validating TCT based on its ability to 
predict accidents may be unnecessary. 
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Validating TCT by evaluating correlation between conflict counts and accident counts 
have also been a subject of intense debate as many TCT studies failed to show an 
acceptable level of correlation or, at best, produced inconsistent findings (see 
Williams, 1981 for a review of some TCT studies). The possible reasons of this 
inconsistency could be the problematic assumption of fixed conflict-accident 
proportionality, considerable measurement errors, and inaccuracy and under-reporting 
of accidents (Songchitruksa and Tarko, 2006; Williams, 1981). Glauz and Migletz 
(1980) identified a detailed list of the reasons why the TCT studies were unfruitful or 
misleading. 
 
Hauer and Garder (1986) addressed the issue of validity more fundamentally rather 
than merely seeking a good statistical correlation between conflicts and accidents. 
They argued that the validity of the technique should be judged by comparing the 
variance of the estimates. It was suggested that the method producing the most 
unbiased estimate with the smallest amount of variance is that with the greatest degree 
of validity. Grayson and Hakkert (1987) further reasoned that validity should not only 
be confined to establishing a statistical relationship between conflict and accident. 
They proposed that construct validity should be established in relation to a common 
causation process that can lead to different outcomes for conflicts and accidents. 
Furthermore, Hauer (1979) argued that the numbers of expected (i.e., the true value) 
conflicts and accidents could be correlated, but not the observed ones. 
 
Reviewing the attempts and arguments of validating TCT, Chin and Quek (1997) 
suggested that it may be a futile and unnecessary exercise to establish a statistically 
significant relationship between conflicts and accident to validate the TCT. They 
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contended that a TCT study should be designed to diagnose safety problems as well as 
to evaluate safety and operational improvements in traffic system.  
 
Relying on accident data to validate the TCT also contradicts TCT’s proactive 
approach to safety. For example, to evaluate safety in a new or upgraded traffic 
infrastructure by using TCT, the technique cannot be validated due to absence of 
sufficient number of accident records. This dependence to accident data restricts the 




This chapter provided a critical review of the traditional techniques of modeling 
collision risk and the traffic conflict technique. In particular, limitations of the 
traditional models were identified and how the traffic conflict technique may overcome 
the limitations was discussed. 
 
Traditionally, the techniques of collision risk modeling rely on expert judgments and 
historical collision data. For qualitative or semi-quantitative evaluation of risk, models 
relying on expert judgments are employed. But, to attain higher degree of insight in 
risk modeling quantitative models are applied which rely mostly on collision data. The 
primary limitation of this approach is that a long waiting time is required to obtain 
large number of collisions, which is necessary for a statistically sound analysis. A 
potential alternative is to use traffic conflicts, instead of using collision data, because 
conflicts occur more frequently than collisions. This approach of safety modeling has 
been developed and implemented for road traffic systems and has shown great 
potential to evaluate safety in a proactive manner. But, it is yet to be implemented in 
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navigational collision risk modeling. This research intends to use this approach for 
modeling collision risks in port waters.  






In modeling collision risk in a port waterway, two major aspects need to be considered. 
Firstly, measuring the level of risk and secondly, understanding the characteristics of 
the risks, i.e., identifying the influential factors of the risks. To address these two 
aspects, two models are developed in this research, namely the Risk measurement 
model and the Risk prediction model.  
 
The risk measurement model measures collision risk in a waterway by analyzing 
critical traffic interactions. This is accomplished by a two step procedure. In the first 
step, collision risk in an interaction is measured by developing a quantitative measure 
of conflicts. An ordered probit model of the risk of collision in an interaction is 
developed for this purpose. The second step involves developing a method for 
measuring collision risk in a waterway. This is accomplished by statistically 
characterizing all interactions in a waterway and identifying the interactions with high 
potential of collision. Validity of the risk measurement model is assessed by evaluating 
correlations between the measured risks and those perceived by pilots.  
 
The risk prediction model explains the relationships between collision risks in 
waterways and the geometric, traffic, and regulatory control characteristics of 
waterways. A systematic method of model formulation, calibration and evaluation is 
developed for this purpose. In formulation of a predictive model, a binomial logistic 
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regression model with considerations for hierarchical data structure is developed that 
accounts for the correlations in risks at different time periods in a waterway. Using 
maximum likelihood estimation method, the model is calibrated and its validity is 
evaluated by using several goodness-of-fit statistics. 
 
This chapter discusses the two models. In particular, formulations of the models along 
with their validation and evaluation procedures are discussed. 
 
3.2 RISK MEASUREMENT MODEL 
 
To measure collision risk in a waterway, it is necessary to measure the conflict 
severities of all vessel interactions in that waterway. A suitable measure of conflict 
severity is then necessary to measure navigational traffic conflicts (NTC) 
quantitatively. After critically examining the suitability of conflict measures that were 
primarily developed to measure road traffic conflicts (RTC), a suitable measure is 
developed to measure NTC. With the measured conflict severities of all interactions in 
a waterway, risk of collision in that waterway can be measured by employing the risk 
measurement model. The formulation of the model is discussed in this section. An 
illustration of the modeling technique will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2.1 METHOD OF MEASURING COLLISION RISK IN AN INTERACTION 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, RTC are found to be measured qualitatively or 
quantitatively. The former method relies on observers to identify and grade conflict 
severities by their judgments. It is criticized by many researchers (e.g., Chin and Quek, 
1997; Glauz and Migletz, 1980; Guttinger, 1982) for its well recognized drawback of 
National University of Singapore 44
Chapter Three: Methodology 
inconsistency in observers’ subjective judgments. To overcome this drawback many 
researchers (e.g., Chin et al., 1991; Guttinger, 1982; Hyden, 1977) employed the 
quantitative measurement method, where conflicts are measured by using surrogate 
safety measures. This method is usually preferred as it is objective and provides a 
quantitative measure. In this research, we espouse this method to develop a suitable 
measure of NTC. 
 
For quantitative measurement of conflicts, researchers have developed many surrogate 
measures in the context of road traffic. To employ these RTC measures for measuring 
NTC it is necessary to critically examine the measures’ suitability in measuring NTC. 
Several RTC measures that may have potential in measuring NTC are examined in the 
context of navigational traffic in the succeeding paragraphs. 
 
The most commonly used temporal RTC measure is the Time to Collision (TTC) 
(Hayward, 1972), which is defined as the expected time for two vessels to collide if 
course and speeds of both vessels remain unchanged. To measure TTC, a prerequisite 
is that collision course must exist between the vessels involved. Therefore, it is 
incapable of measuring conflicts, where a collision course does not exist. However, 
vessels could pass each other with a narrow space/time margin, which may be a safety 
concern. Since TTC can vary throughout an interaction process, researchers considered 
different points at which TTC should be measured (Horst, 1990). The most commonly 
used measure is the minimum registered value of TTC in an interaction process (Chin 
et al., 1991) and the TTC at the onset of taking evasive actions, which is termed as 
Time to Accident (TA) (Hyden, 1977). A prerequisite of measuring TA is that the 
evasive actions must be observable. However, measuring conflicts depending on 
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observable evasive actions could be misleading (Chin and Quek, 1997). More 
importantly, it would be difficult to observe such actions in the context of navigational 
traffic. Based on the TTC concept, Minderhoud and Bovy (2001) proposed two more 
explorative measures – Time Exposed TTC (TET) and Time Integrated TTC (TIT). 
These two measures do not rely on observable evasive actions, but suffer from the 
limitation of collision course existence criterion. Moreover, they are highly data-
intensive and attainable only in simulation environment. Although the other measures 
of the TTC family are easy to measure and apply, they may not be appropriate to 
measure NTC due to the limitations. 
 
Researchers (Allen et al., 1978) proposed another temporal measure – Post 
Encroachment Time (PET) that overcomes the major limitations of the TTC family. 
The PET is the time lapse between end of encroachment of a vessel on a potential 
collision point and the time that the other vessel actually arrives at that point. It is 
especially suitable for measuring conflicts in which two vessels pass over a common 
spatial point or area with a temporal difference, regardless of the collision course 
existence criterion. Although it overcomes this limitation of TTC, it suffers from a 
couple of major drawbacks. Firstly, only the conflicts involving vessels with 
transversal trajectories can be measured by PET. Conflicts involving vessels with 
similar or nearly opposite trajectories cannot be measured because of the absence of 
any point of collision. Secondly, to measure PET a fixed projected point of collision is 
required, rather than one that changes with dynamics of vessel interactions. Several 
derivatives of the PET measure were also proposed by Allen et al. (1978), such as Gap 
time, Encroachment time, Initially attempted PET. However, these measures are also 
constrained by one/both of the limitations of PET. Since NTC can be of several types 
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(such as meeting/head-on, overtaking, crossing, and hitting a stationary vessel) and 
PET is capable of measuring the crossing type only, the PET measure family losses its 
suitability for measuring NTC. 
 
Besides the time-based measures, some other measures that explain spatial or 
kinematic characteristics of vessel interactions were proposed for measuring RTC. A 
spatial measure, the Proportion of Stopping Distance (PSD) represents the ratio of the 
distance available for maneuvering to that of the necessary stopping distance to a 
projected point of collision (FHWA, 2003). A kinematic measure, the Required 
Deceleration Rate (RDR) is the maximum uniform rate at which a vessel must 
decelerate to avoid a collision. These two measures are particularly suitable for 
measuring RTC as the maneuvering space on road is very limited. For measuring NTC, 
these may not be suitable enough due to availability of considerably higher 
maneuvering space in navigation, compared to road driving, which allows pilots to 
alter course and/or slacken speed in order to avoid collisions, instead of stopping. 
 
The foregoing shows that the RTC measures are not suitable for measuring NTC, 
mainly because of a dimensional difference between the two types of conflicts. The 
RTC is often measured in one-dimension, whereas the NTC is required to be measured 
two-dimensionally. Conceptually, the measures of TTC family are incapable of 
measuring the NTC in which collision course does not exist between the involved 
vessels. Although the PET measure and its derivatives can overcome this limitation, 
use of them are limited to measuring crossing type of conflicts only. The PSD and 
RDR are capable of measuring all types of NTC, but they do not match the 
characteristics of navigational traffic. Therefore, to measure NTC correctly it is 
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necessary to develop a measure that would suit the two-dimensional traffic 
characteristics. Measuring NTC spatially as well as temporally would be useful for this 
purpose. 
 
3.2.1.1 Development of Conflict Measure 
 
A quantitative measure of NTC is developed which expresses risk of collision in an 
interaction by employing two proximity indicators. These indicators, Distance at 
Closest Point of Approach (DCPA) and Time to Closest Point of Approach (TCPA), 
represent spatial and temporal closeness between a pair of vessels. DCPA and TCPA 
are respectively the probable distance between a vessel pair at their Closest Point of 
Approach (CPA) and the time required to reach CPA, given that the course and speed 
of both vessels remain unchanged. Both indicators are independent of collision course 
existence criteria and are capable of measuring all types of NTC. Furthermore, the 
indicators can easily be calculated from vessels’ position and speed vectors. 
 
The proximity indicators have been employed in on-board navigation and navigational 
research for many years. Navigators make use of these parameters in order to assess 
collision risk in on-board navigation. These are also used in navigational studies of 
different aspects, such as development and evaluation of navigational support systems 
(Q. Liu et al., 2006; Pedersen et al., 2003; Sato and Ishii, 1998), traffic density analysis 
(Merrick et al., 2003) and ship domain analysis (Szlapczynski, 2006; Zhu et al., 2001). 
Being used in navigation and navigational studies, the indicators have general 
acceptability to navigators and researchers. 
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Figure 3.1 A Typical Interaction showing Spatial and Temporal Proximity 
Indicators 
 
To derive DCPA and TCPA in a vessel interaction (see Figure 3.1), let vessels  and 
 are approaching each other from their current positions  and  at 
speeds of  and  respectively at time t. If they maintain their speeds and 
courses, they will reach at CPA after a time period equal to TCPA. By making use of 
this condition, DCPA and TCPA can be derived in terms of the vessels’ current 
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In general, vessels would keep changing their speeds and courses throughout an 
interaction process while taking some evasive actions to avoid collision or just taking 
some precautionary actions. Consequently, the values of DCPA and TCPA would be 
changing with time, but not necessarily simultaneously increasing or decreasing. 
Therefore, to express the risk of collision in an interaction at a particular time t, it is 
necessary to develop a relationship between the risk and the two proximity indicators,  
 
( ) ( )( tftC PIX= )  (3.3) 
 
where  is the risk of collision in an interaction at time t and  is a vector of 
the proximity indicators. The maximum of  in an interaction process, , is 
taken to represent the conflict severity of that interaction. A method of developing the 
relationship between collision risk in an interaction and the proximity indicators is 




3.2.1.2 Modeling Collision Risk in an Interaction 
 
A relationship between collision risk in an interaction and the proximity indicators can 
be obtained by employing expert judgments on collision risks. It is reasonable to 
assume that the perception of pilots reflects the actual risks of collision in different 
interactions, because pilots are very familiar with the characteristics of port waterways 
from their years of experience and they are the only group of people who assess and 
mitigate the risks in navigation. Expert judgments on collision risks can be collected 
through a risk perception survey on harbor pilots, where pilots can be asked to rate 
collision risks in different vessel interactions, which are explained by the two 
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proximity indicators. Intensity of risk can be expressed by a scale categorizing risk into 
five levels, as shown in Table 3.1.  
 
Since the risk levels used in the scale are ordered in nature, an ordered categorical 
analysis will be most appropriate to treat such data. Two possible regression models 
may be employed: the ordered probit or ordered logit models. The models differ in the 
assumption of the distributions of regression errors. The probit model assumes a 
normal distribution of errors with mean 0 and variance 1, whereas the logit model 
assumes a standard logistic distribution with mean 0 and variance 32π . The ordered 
probit model is selected for this research though the choice matters little as both 
models produce very similar results. 
 
Table 3.1 Scale of Perceived Collision Risk in an Interaction 
 
Risk level Level of actions necessary to avoid collision Risk level indicator, m 
Very high (VHR) Collision imminent, cannot be avoided 1 
High (HR) Immediate actions needed 2 
Moderate (MR) Take precautionary actions, communicate with other ship 3 
Low (LR) Keep safe navigational watch 4 
Safe No actions necessary 5 
 
 
The ordered probit model is usually formulated as a latent (i.e., unobserved) variable 
framework. The structural model specification is 
 
iiPIiy ε+= βX*  (3.4) 
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where  is a continuous latent variable measuring perceived collision risk for the ith 
set of ;  is the vector of independent variables (i.e., DCPA and TCPA); β  is 




iε  is the random error term. 
 
The latent variable is mapped on to an observed ordinal variable y, which represents 
the risk levels used in the scale, as 
 
mimi ymy λλ <≤= − *1  if  ; for m = 1 to M (3.5) 
 
where M is number of ordinal categories (as indicated in Table 3.1) and the threshold 
values (λ ) are unknown parameters describing the boundaries of risk levels. 
 
Based on the normality assumption of the error term, the probability of risk level m for 
given  can be predicted as PIX
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Once the probabilities of each risk level are predicted, the associated collision risk in 
an interaction can be computed. To do so, risk scores (RSm) are assigned to each risk 
level based on the thresholds, as shown in Figure 3.2. The RSm represents the 
probability of collision for risk level m. Using the proposed risk scale, risk scores for 
VHR and Safe levels are assigned values of 1 and 0 respectively. The VHR level refers 
to vessel interactions where collision cannot be avoided, which represents the 
probability of collision as 1. On the other hand where no action is required under the 
Safe level, the probability of collision is zero. Therefore, the λ  values are normalized 
to a probability value with the range [0, 1]. Collision risk in an interaction can then be 
computed as 
 







rPˆ XX ; ( ) 10 ≤≤ tC  (3.7) 
 
In order to examine the significance of ’s included in model the z-test is employed 
and to evaluate if the model have sufficient explanatory and predictive power several 
goodness-of-fit (gof) measures found in Long and Freese (2006) are used. The 
likelihood ratio statistics is used to examine the overall gof of the model by testing the 
global null hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are zero. The McKelvey 
and Zavoina’s R2 is also used to measure the predictive power of the model. 
PIX
 
The risk of collision in any vessel interaction may vary with the size of vessels 
involved. Perez and Clemente (2007) have shown that maneuverability and ease in 
speed adjustments diminishes as vessel size increases and for this reason, vessels of 
different sizes would produce different levels of risk in an interaction. Consequently, 
the risks perceived by pilots may also vary. In order to consider the effects of vessel 
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sizes in modeling the risks, vessels may be clustered into several vessel classes (VC) 
according to Gross Tonnage (GT). 
 
As the perceived risk is influenced by the pilot’s experience in a particular vessel class, 
both experience and VC need to be considered together in a perception survey. In 
general, pilots with more experience are authorized to operate VC with higher GT, a 
positive association between experience and VC will exist. Hence, modeling the risks 
separately for each VC is necessary.  
 
Furthermore, navigation is affected by the environment, and in particular, in day and 
night settings (see Akten, 2004). Therefore, perceived risks would also be different for 
day and night conditions. Hence, the risks need to be modeled separately for day and 
night conditions. 
 
3.2.1.3 Perception Survey on Collision Risk in an Interaction 
 
To calibrate the parameters of the ordered probit model, perceptions of collision risks 
under different vessel interaction situations need to be obtained from pilots. Perceived 
risk data can be collected by employing two experimental methods: simulation or 
survey. The former is an exercise which can be carried out using ship-handling 
simulators, where pilots are asked to navigate vessels in a specified navigational 
environment and to judge collision risks at various stages of the navigation. The 
difficulty in a simulation exercise is the amount of resources needed for a sufficiently 
large number of pilots to ensure a sound statistical analysis. On the other hand, the 
survey method involves conducting questionnaires among pilots by generating a 
suitable platform for them to judge collision risk. In this case, the proximity indicators 
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would be used to define the navigational conditions, and pilots would specify the level 
of their perceived risk under various conditions of DCPA and TCPA. The survey 
method allows a high amount of respondents to be obtained easily for a proper 
statistical analysis. Therefore, the survey method is employed in this research. 
 
To collect perceived risk data, it is necessary to develop a two-way risk matrix, defined 
by different values of the proximity indicators. The appropriate values of DCPA and 
TCPA used in classifying the different navigational situation were determined based 
on the expert input of several experienced pilots in a preliminary survey. Based on the 
outcome of the preliminary survey, a 5 x 5 risk matrix is formulated, representing five 
threshold values of TCPA ( )20,10,5,3,1∈  minutes and five values of DCPA 
 cables length( 10,7,5,2,1∈ )
                                                
1. Pilots are asked to indicate their level of perceived risk of 
collision in terms of Safe, Low Risk, Moderate Risk, High Risk and Very High Risk, 
for each of the 25 combinations of DCPA and TCPA. The perceived risk are needed to 
be collected separately for the day and night conditions. A copy of the designed survey 
is shown in Appendix A. 
 
3.2.2 METHOD OF MEASURING COLLISION RISK IN A WATERWAY 
 
The preceding section shows the method of obtaining the  value in an interaction. 
To measure collision risk in a waterway,  values of all interactions in the 
waterway need to be obtained for a specified time period. Since the  values are 
obtained from continuous measurement of , it is necessary to truncate the 






1 1 cable length = 0.1 nautical mile 
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any significant risk of collision. The truncation point can be defined by employing the 
concept of Ship Domain (SD), which is the surrounding effective waters around a 
vessel that a pilot wants to keep clear of other vessels (Goodwin, 1975). It means that a 
pilot senses there is a risk of collision only if another vessel penetrates his vessel’s 
domain. Therefore only the interactions, where one vessel is within the SD of the 
other, are considered for conflict analysis. These interactions are termed as ‘encounter’ 











Slight / Low-risk conflicts
Serious conflicts / Near-misses 
 
 
Figure 3.3 A Safety Pyramid of Navigational Traffic Events 
 
To characterize the conflict severities of the encounters in a waterway, a probability 
distribution function (PDF) of Cmax can be obtained. Since the Cmax values are 
truncated at SD in each encounter, a set of truncated distributions need to be chosen to 
examine their fitness with the observed Cmax values. Based on the traffic safety 
pyramid proposed by Hyden (1987), the frequency distribution of conflict severity 
observations would be skewed to the right, i.e., higher frequencies for smaller Cmax 
values (lower risk) and vice versa. A similar safety pyramid for navigational traffic is 
National University of Singapore 56
Chapter Three: Methodology 
presented in Figure 3.3. The right skewed distribution pattern of conflict severity 
observations is also found in Chin et al. (1991). To obtain a similar distribution, the 
measure of conflict severity can be used as ))1/(1( maxmax CC −=′ . Since  ranges 
from 0 (safe, obtained at SD boundary) to 1 (extreme collision risk), the distribution of 
 is left-truncated at 
maxC
maxC ′ 1max =′C  and is asymptotic towards right. Therefore, for the 
distribution fitting exercise the following truncated distributions can be prescribed: 
negative exponential, gamma, weibull, lognormal, and loglogistic. Table 3.2 presents 
the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the distributions. 
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To examine which distribution fits the observed data best, the Anderson-Darling (AD) 
test can be employed. The test statistics (AD2) measures how well the data follow a 
particular distribution (see Stephens, 1974). The statistics is obtained as 
 










2 1lnln21 )]  (3.8) 
 
where N is the number of observations; F(·) is the CDF of the tested distribution; and 
D is the observation values sorted in ascending order. The statistics is compared 
against its critical values at specified significance level in order to examine fitness of 
the distributions (see Stephens, 1974). 
 
Once the PDF of , maxC ′ )( maxmax CfC ′′
)
 is obtained, its CDF  can be obtained 
by considering the proportions of non-conflict and conflict encounters. The non-
conflict encounters, where vessels have diverging trajectories although one vessel is 
within the SD of the other, correspond to negative TCPA values and are represented by 
a probability mass function (PMF) . In contrast, the conflict encounters, where 
the measured TCPA is non-negative, are represented by . Therefore, the 
area under the  is equal to 
)( maxmax CFC ′′




C ′′ maxfC )]0(p− , which yields 
 










dqqfppCF  (3.9) 
 
where CSD is a constant value (= 1) of maxC ′  at truncation point (i.e., at SD). 
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Since  represents the severity of conflict, the area under the tail end of 
 (as shown in Figure 3.4) can be employed to measure collision risk in 
terms of probability of serious conflict per encounter. This can be accomplished by 
setting a threshold value (
maxC ′
)maxC ′(maxfC′
τ ) of maxC ′  which will separate the serious conflicts from the 
non-serious ones (see Chin and Quek, 1997). A serious conflict corresponds to an 
encounter that may pose risk of a certain collision. Therefore, the risk of collision in a 
waterway can be expressed as 
 




















Figure 3.4 A Typical PDF of Cmax′  showing Distribution Truncation and Serious 
Conflict Threshold 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1.2, the risk of collision in any vessel interaction may vary 
with the size of vessels involved. In order to consider the effects of vessel sizes in 
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instead of a single threshold. The distribution may be obtained by clustering vessels 
into several vessel classes (VC). The risk of collision is then expressed as 
 







max 1 ττ τ  (3.11) 
 
where  is the PMF of VCs, vcp vcτ  is the threshold value for vessel class vc, V is the 
number of VCs. 
 
The Pc represents collision risk in terms of probability of serious conflict per encounter 
at a specific time period in a waterway. It could be used as an indicator of the state of 
safety in that waterway. For this reason, it may be directly employed to compare safety 
among waterways or time periods, or to evaluate a before-and-after study of 
navigational facilities. 
 
3.2.3 METHOD OF MODEL VALIDATION 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, it may be a futile exercise to validate the proposed 
conflict model based on correlations of measured conflicts and observed collisions. 
Therefore, it is attempted to validate the model by evaluating correlations between the 
measured risks of collision in waterways and those perceived by pilots. This approach 
of model validation does not need to rely on observed collision records, thus retains the 
proactive nature of the modeling technique. Moreover, conceptually it is sensible to 
compare the measured and perceived risks as pilots are very familiar with port 
waterways, and thus have sufficient knowledge regarding the actual risks in 
waterways. By analyzing pilot’s perceived risks in fairways, Debnath and Chin (2009) 
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have also concluded that pilots seem to have reasonable grasp of the characteristics of 
collision risks in fairways. 
 
To compute the correlations between measured collision risks and pilots’ perceived 
risks, the Pearson correlation coefficient (see Long and Freese, 2006) can be 





σρ ,, =  (3.12) 
 
where MR and PR are two random variables representing the measured risk and the 
perceived risk respectively; MRσ  is the standard deviation of MR; PRσ  is the standard 
deviation of PR; PRMR,σ  is the covariance between MR and PR. 
 
The correlation is 1 in the case of an increasing linear relationship, −1 in the case of a 
decreasing linear relationship, and some value in between in all other cases, indicating 
the degree of linear dependence between the variables. The closer the coefficient is to 
either −1 or 1, the stronger the correlation between the variables. 
 
To gain information on pilot’s perceived risks in waterways, it is necessary to conduct 
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3.2.3.1 Perception Survey on Collision Risk in a Waterway 
 
To facilitate the perception process of pilots a five-point scale is developed based on 
the ‘likelihood of a close quarter situation (CQS) in a waterway’, as presented in Table 
3.3. A CQS is a critical incident that poses risk of collision but not necessarily involve 
a collision. Conceptually, it is similar to a serious conflict. Since pilots are more 
familiar with the term ‘CQS’, it is used in this survey. It is reasonable to assume that 
the risk of collision is higher when the likelihood of CQS is higher. 
 
In this survey, a total of 15 fairway sections, 9 anchorage clusters and 5 intersections in 
Singapore port are considered. These waterways are further described in Section 4.2. 
Pilots are asked to indicate their level of perceived risk of collision in terms of the five 
risk levels used in the scale. To obtain representative risks for navigation in day and 
night, the perceived risks are needed to be collected separately for day and night 
conditions. A copy of the survey form (showing a set of waterways) is presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
Table 3.3 Scale of Perceived Collision Risk in a Waterway 
 
Score Risk level Likelihood of a close quarter situation in a waterway 
1 Safe Very unlikely 
2 Low risk Unlikely 
3 Moderate risk Moderate chance 
4 High risk Likely 
5 Very high risk Very likely 
 
 
In designing the survey, considerations need to take into account potential biases in 
perceived risks. Four general sources of biases, identified by Weinstein (1987) and 
Fischhoff et al. (1993), are carefully examined in the design process. The first is 
‘unwarranted optimism bias’, which indicates that people tend to be excessively 
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optimistic and overconfident while judging likelihood of own involvement in risky 
events. This could lead pilots to overrate their pilotage skills and to consider 
themselves as less likely to be involved in risky events. To avoid this bias in this 
survey, the pilots are asked to perceive risks in such a way that it does not relate to the 
risk of their own involvement. They are asked to perceive the overall risks in 
waterways so that these could reflect the actual risks in the waterways. 
 
The second is ‘anchoring bias’ in which respondents tend to anchor their risk estimates 
around some known values of actual risk (e.g., from collision statistics). In this survey, 
no statistics are provided so that pilots will not make biased responses. 
 
The third is ‘availability bias’ and this is the bias that could result from collision 
experiences or disproportionately available information regarding collisions in media, 
such as highlighted news which are easily remembered. Therefore, a pilot, who has 
experienced a collision in a particular waterway or read/seen news regarding collisions 
in media, could rate higher collision risk in that waterway, compared to a pilot who has 
no such experience or information. In order to avoid this potential source of bias, pilots 
are asked to perceive risks from their judgments regarding likelihood of CQSs in 
waterways. The reason of using the CQSs, instead of collisions, is that the CQSs are 
likely to occur considerably more frequently than collisions. This increases the 
probability of having CQS experiences for all pilots, whereas their chance of having 
collision experiences is very low. Thus, most of the pilots could have CQS experience, 
resulting in a uniform bias in their perceptions. Moreover, CQS are usually not 
reported in media, thus reducing the chances of obtaining disproportionately available 
information. 
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The fourth bias is the tendency of respondents to overestimate the risk of very rare 
events and to underestimate the risks of events that occur very frequently. Since 
collisions are very rare events, using them as basis in risk perception could result is 
biased perceptions. On the other hand, the CQSs do not occur very frequently so that 
the perceptions could be biased due to underestimation. Thus, using the CQS as basis 
in risk perception could reduce this bias. 
 
3.3 RISK PREDICTION MODEL 
 
Risk of collision in a waterway can be expressed in different ways for various 
purposes. Some studies represented the risk of collision based on collision frequencies, 
whereas some used the consequences of collisions (i.e., injuries and fatalities) to 
represent it. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, this collision-data-based approach 
suffers from several serious limitations. The major limitation is that it is difficult to 
obtain statistically sound inferences from analysis of collision records due to the very 
infrequent nature of collision occurrence leading to low number of observations. To 
overcome this limitation, a possible way of expressing collision risk is to focus on 
conflict occurrence, instead of relying on collision occurrence. As shown in Section 
3.2, risk of collision can be expressed as the probability of serious conflict per vessel 
encounter. In other words, collision risk in a waterway is the proportion of the number 
of serious conflicts and the number of total encounters in that waterway. 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, a binomial logit/probit model is an appropriate choice to 
model a binary or proportional response variable. Taking risk of collision at different 
time periods in a waterway as response variable, these models consider each 
‘waterway’-‘time period’ combination as a unit of observation. An underlying 
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assumption of such a model is that all the observation units are independent of each 
other. However, this assumption is not valid because collision risks at different time 
periods in a particular waterway are likely to be correlated due to the fixed 
characteristics of waterway over the time periods (e.g., geometric and regulatory 
control characteristics). In order to take the correlated data structure into consideration 
in predictive modeling of collision risk, a hierarchical regression model can be useful. 
 
A hierarchical regression model allows potential correlation among observation units 
within a panel (i.e., hierarchical data structure) to be correctly specified and estimated 
(Snijders and Bosker, 1999). A good number of applications of this modeling 
technique can be found in sociological research disciplines. In traffic safety research, 
Jones and Jorgensen (2003) presented a good exploration and discussion on the 
potential applications of this technique.  
 
To develop a prediction model of collision risks at day and night time periods in 
different waterways, a model with properly specified hierarchical data structure is 
necessary. A binomial logistic model is proposed that could account for the 
correlations among within panel observations. A systematic procedure of evaluating 
the model is employed in order to assess the existence of overdispersion and the fitness 
of a best-fitted model, which is obtained through a process of model comparison by 
using Akaike Information Criteria. In this section, the formulation of the model is 
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3.3.1 MODEL FORMULATION 
 
A Binomial Logistic Model (BLM) is appropriate to use when the response variable is 
a dichotomy (an event occurred or not) or a proportion (number of events occurred 
with a particular outcome divided by total number of events). In this research, the 
response variable, which expresses the risk of collision in a waterway as the 
probability of a serious conflict in an encounter, is proportional in nature.  
 
An encounter e at time t in waterway w can have two possible forms: serious conflict 
(Yewt = 1) and non-serious conflict (Yewt = 0). The probability that a serious conflict will 
occur is , which follows a binomial distribution. Since the  is 
restricted within the range , the probability is transformed into the logarithm of 
the odds, 
( 1Pr == ewtewt Yp ) ewtp
]1 ,0[
( ) ( )( ewt )pewtpewtpLogit −= log 1 , which ranges from  (pewt = 0) to ∞− ∞  
(pewt = 1). The BLM is obtained by treating the logit transformation as a link function 
in the generalized linear model framework (see Hardin and Hilbe, 2007 for a detailed 











−1log  (3.13) 
 
where Xewt is a vector of explanatory variables and β  is the vector of  unknown 
parameters explaining effects of the explanatory variables. 
 
The probability that a serious conflict will occur is then expressed as 
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+=  (3.14) 
 
The BLM can also be applied to model a proportional response variable. Suppose, in a 
waterway w at time period t, ywt is the number of serious conflicts and nwt is the total 
number of encounters. The ywt follows a binomial distribution, . 
Therefore, the expected number of serious conflicts in waterway w at time period t is 
),;( ewtwtwt pnyf
 
ewtwtwt pnyE =)(  (3.15) 
 
The proportional response variable, wtwt ny ,  is then equivalent to  as ewtp
 
ewtwtwt pnyE =)(  (3.16) 
 
As shown in Equation 3.14, the  can be modeled by employing a BLM. Therefore, 
the BLM can be employed to model the proportional response variable as well. 
ewtp
 
An alternative to the BLM is the Binomial Probit Model (BPM) that uses a standard 
cumulative normal distribution function to explain the . Since the normal and the 
logistic distribution have similar shapes, the models produce very similar results. 
Although theoretically there is no compelling reason to prefer one model over another, 
in practice, the BLM is chosen for this research because it allows interpreting the 
effects of explanatory variables as Odds Ratio (O.R.). 
ewtp
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In order to interpret the effects of explanatory variables, the exponential of the 
regression coefficients, i.e., )exp(β can be calculated to obtain O.R.. This provides a 
basic interpretation for the magnitude of β : if O.R. is less than 1.0, a unit increase in 
an explanatory variable will reduce the odds of a serious conflict by a multiplicative 
effect of )exp(β  and vice versa. In case of categorical variables, )exp( ba ββ −
b
can be 
calculated which represents the O.R. between two categories, a and  for comparison 
purpose. 
 
3.3.2 CONSIDERATIONS FOR HIERARCHICAL DATA 
 
In the presence of within-panel correlation in response variable, models without 
appropriately considering the hierarchical data structure may yield biased results. The 
correlation of the observations within a panel violates the assumption in an Ordinary 
Regression Model (ORM), such as the BLM, that all observations across all panels are 
independent. When this assumption is violated, the ORM underestimates the standard 
errors of the regression coefficients. This underestimation results in obtaining falsely 
significant results (Allison, 1999). A hierarchical model, on the other hand, takes into 
consideration the correlated structure of observations in estimation of the standard 
errors. 
 
Risks of collision at different time periods (i.e., day and night) in a particular waterway 
are likely to be correlated. This is because of the fixed characteristics of the waterway 
over the time periods (e.g., geometric and regulatory control characteristics). To 
account for this within-waterway correlation, two possible formulations of the BLM 
can be proposed: Random intercept BLM and BLM with modified sandwich variance 
matrix. These formulations are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
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3.3.2.1 Random Intercept Binomial Logistic Model 
 
In a Random Intercept BLM (RIBLM), the intercept of the model is allowed to differ 
across clusters (i.e., fairways), whereas the intercept is kept constant in a BLM. Thus, 
the structural form of a BLM can be modified to obtain a RIBLM as (see Snijders and 












− β  (3.17) 
 
where  is the probability of serious conflict in waterway w at time t, wtp w0β  is the 
intercept that differs across clusters w,  and  are vectors of explanatory 
variables related to waterway (level-2) and time periods (level-1) respectively,  and 






In the RIBLM, the within-fairway correlation is specified as 
 
ww u+= αβ0  (3.18) 
 
where α  is the average intercept across all time periods and all waterways, and  is 
the unobserved random effects of waterway w assumed to follow normal distribution 
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While a RIBLM specifies the correlated data structure correctly, there is a tradeoff of 
using this model. A RIBLM requires more complex computations, and consequently 
longer time to converge, in comparison with a BLM. In addition, if a large set of 
explanatory variables is included in the model with low numbers of panels and within-
panel observations, model convergence may not be achieved. 
 
3.3.2.2 Binomial Logistic Model with Modified Sandwich Variance Matrix 
 
Another possible and simpler approach of taking into consideration the within-
waterway correlations is to employ a BLM while specifying the hierarchical data 
structure for computation of standard errors. Instead of including a random effect 
parameter in the model, the standard errors are computed separately from model 
estimation in this approach. The key idea is that since an ordinary BLM underestimates 
standard errors in a correlated data structure, this approach computes the standard 
errors by treating the correlations and keeps the other computations similar to an 
ordinary BLM. Thus, this configuration of the BLM produces the same estimates of 
the coefficients as are estimated by an ordinary BLM, but the standard errors and 
confidence intervals are estimated by considering the within-waterway correlations.  
 
In this approach, a BLM uses a modified sandwich (also known as Clustered Robust or 
Clustered Huber) variance matrix to find the maximum likelihood estimates while 
treating the correlated data structure (see Hardin and Hilbe, 2007 for details). The 
matrix has a score factor, , sandwiched between two copies of Hessian matrix, 
which is usually used in estimating parameters of an ordinary BLM, as 
MSBˆ
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11 ˆˆˆˆ −−= HMSHMH VBVV  (3.19) 
 
where if each panel w  (i.e., waterway) contains Tw observations (i.e., time periods), xwt 
refers to the row of the matrix X associated with the tth observation for subject w,  is 
the scale parameter, 
φˆ
η  is the linear predictor = β , and X wtμ  is the expected number of 
serious conflicts in waterway w at time period t (= ), the score factor is given as ewtwt pn
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μA  is the log likelihood 
function of the model. 
 
In maximum likelihood estimation method, the regression coefficients of the BLM are 
estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function, and the sandwich variance matrix 
is used to estimate the standard errors and confidence intervals of the coefficients. The 
main advantages of using this configuration of the BLM are that it is a less complex 
method and model convergence can be achieved with a smaller number of panels and 
observations, compared to a RIBLM. 
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3.3.3 MODEL EVALUATION 
 
An important part of statistical modeling is evaluating the appropriateness and fitness 
of a model by employing various hypothesis tests and goodness-of-fit statistics. The 
tests and statistics used in this research are discussed in this section. 
 
3.3.3.1 Overdispersion Assessment 
 
Overdispersion is a primary problem in modeling discrete response variable. It 
generally occurs when the variance of the response variable is greater than the nominal 
variance. The problem with overdispersion is that it may cause underestimation of 
standard errors of the regression coefficients which will lead to obtaining falsely 
significant results. Therefore, it is necessary to assess if a discrete-response model is 
overdispersed. 
 
Existence of overdispersion can be identified by observing the value of the dispersion 
statistics (Hardin and Hilbe, 2007), 
 




−−= βφψ 2  (3.22) 
 
where φ  is the scale parameter (equal to 1 for a binomial variance model), )(βLL  is 
the log-likelihood of the model in consideration,  is the log-likelihood of a 
fully-specified model (a model with as many independent parameters as observations), 
N is the total number of observations and k is the number of parameters to be 
estimated. A value of 
)(FLL
ψ  greater than 1.0 indicates existence of overdispersion. As 
suggested by Hardin and Hilbe (2007), a small amount of overdispersion is of little 
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concern. However, if ψ  greater than 2.0, then an adjustment to the standard errors is 
necessary.  
 
3.3.3.2 Model Comparison 
 
Selecting the most parsimonious model among a set of competing models is one of the 
objectives of statistical modeling. The general principle is that the best model is the 
one with least complexity among various models with different number of parameters. 
Since increasing complexity is accompanied by a better fit, models are compared by 
trading off these two quantities. A common procedure of comparing models is using 
the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), developed by Akaike (1973). The AIC statistics 
is given by 
 
( ) kLLAIC 22 +−= β  (3.23) 
 
where )(βLL  is the log-likelihood value of the candidate model at convergence and k 
is the number of parameters to be estimated. The better model will result in a smaller 
AIC value (Joshua and Garber, 1990). Starting with a full set of explanatory variables, 
a systematic procedure to eliminate the insignificant variables one at a time may be 
employed by comparing the different AIC values.  The resulting model with minimum 
AIC value may be considered the best-fitted and most parsimonious model. 
 
3.3.3.3 Model Fitness Assessment 
 
Another important step of model evaluation is to examine the significance of the 
explanatory variables obtained in the best-fitted model. To test whether an estimated 
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regression coefficient is significantly different from zero or not, the z-test is usually 
employed. Furthermore, to evaluate if the best-fitted model have sufficient explanatory 
and predictive power, several goodness-of-fit statistics are used (see Long and Freese, 
2006 for a list of such statistics). 
 
To measure the overall goodness-of-fit, the likelihood ratio statistics ( 2G ) is used. This 
statistics is given by 
 
( ) ( )[ 022 LLLLG −= β ] (3.24) 
 
where )(βLL  and  are the log-likelihoods of the best-fitted model and the null 
model respectively. Since  follows a  distribution, it is compared against a 
critical value of a  distribution at a specified level of significance. A value of  
higher than the critical value rejects the global null hypothesis that all coefficients 






To examine the predictive power of the model, the log-likelihood ratio index, a 
measure of statistical fitness used for an indication of the additional variation of an 
obtained model compared to a null model, can be employed. However, it has an 
undesirable characteristic that for the same data set, it will increase whenever new 
variables are added to the model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). To overcome this 
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3.4 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presented the methodology of this research. Two models were formulated 
for measuring the level of collision risk in a waterway and understanding the 
relationships between the risks and waterway characteristics. 
 
A risk measurement model was formulated that measures risk of collision in a 
waterway by analyzing critical traffic interactions. In the formulation, a method of 
measuring collision risk in an interaction was developed first which employs an 
ordered probit model to model the risks as a function of two proximity indicators. A 
perception survey was designed for calibration of the ordered model. A method of 
measuring collision risk in a waterway was developed next that statistically 
characterizes the measured risks collectively. Several statistical distributions including 
the negative exponential, gamma, weibull, lognormal and loglogistic were proposed 
for characterizing the risks. Anderson Darling test was employed to examine the 
goodness-of-fit of the distributions. To validate the risk measurement model, a 
framework was developed that evaluates the correlations between the measured risks 
and those perceived by pilots. To collect the perceived risk data, another perception 
survey was designed. The technique of risk measurement modeling is illustrated later 
in Chapter 4. 
 
For explaining the relationships between the risks of collision in waterways and the 
geometric, traffic and regulatory control characteristics of waterways, a risk prediction 
model was proposed. A systematic method of model formulation, calibration and 
evaluation was developed for this purpose. In the formulation, a binomial logistic 
model with considerations for hierarchical data structure was developed that accounts 
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for the potential correlations in risks at different time periods in a waterway. For 
evaluating model fitness, predictive power and existence of overdispersion, several 
goodness-of-fit statistics were employed. The modeling technique is illustrated later in 
Chapter 5. 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 






A model for measuring collision risks in port waterways was presented in Chapter 3. In 
this chapter, the modeling technique is illustrated and validated using Singapore port 
data. Following a description of the waterways (i.e., fairways, anchorages and 
intersections) in Singapore port waters, the collection and preparation procedure of the 
data necessary for the model is discussed first. The results of risk measurement in an 
interaction is presented then, followed by the results of measured risks in the 
waterways. The risk measurement model is validated afterwards before providing a 
summary of this chapter. 
 
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF SINGAPORE PORT WATERS 
 
The port of Singapore is a mega transshipment hub and one of the busiest sea ports in 
the world. Every year it receives calls from about 130,000 vessels totaling about 1.5 
billion gross tonnage. Use of modern facilities in port operations and traffic 
management has consistently helped it to achieve top ratings among competitive ports. 
 
Singapore port waters constitute three typical types of waterways – fairways, 
anchorages and intersections. These waterway types form the traffic network of the 
port. The fairways serve as links in the network, while the intersections are the nodes. 
The anchorages provide facilities for anchoring the vessels calling to port terminals or 
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waiting for bunkers. According to the operational definitions of the waterway types 
(MPA, 2006), the traffic network is composed of 12 fairways and 5 intersections. In 
addition, a total of 34 anchorages serve the traffic depending on anchoring purposes. 
 
For modeling risks of collision in the waterways, it is necessary to divide them into 
sections. The fairways can be divided into sections by using two approaches: fixed-
length sections or homogeneous sections (see Miaou et al., 1991 for a discussion on 
dividing roadways). Since fairways and roadways are similar from their functional 
point of view, the two approaches could be useful in dividing the fairways. Using 
fixed-length sections, it may be difficult to divide the fairways due to diversity in 
fairway lengths. In contrast, the concept of homogeneous sections (i.e., sections with 
approximately uniform geometric and traffic control characteristics) would be useful 
for this purpose. From operational definitions of fairways, the fairways are divided into 
15 approximately homogeneous sections. A map showing the fairway sections 




Figure 4.1 Fairways in Singapore Port Waters 
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Figure 4.3 Intersections in Singapore Port Waters 
 
Dividing anchorages and intersections is pretty straightforward because of the 
uniformity in their characteristics. Anchorages are usually well defined on maps and 
sometimes bounded by navigational aids (i.e., buoys). In general, the anchorages 
serving similar purposes are clustered together. Therefore, the clusters could be a 
useful basis of dividing anchorages. A total of 9 clusters are defined (shown in Figure 
4.2 as hatched areas). The intersections are defined on the basis of traffic interactions. 
Cross traffic interactions are allowed only at intersections. Following the directions of 
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traffic movements in the fairways, the water areas attributing cross-traffic interactions 
are identified. A total of 5 intersections are found, as shown in Figure 4.3 as hatched 
areas. 
 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION AND PREPARATION 
 
To obtain an overall representative measure of collision risk in a waterway, it is 
necessary to measure collision risks separately for day and night conditions. This is 
because navigation is affected by the environment, and in particular, in day and night 
settings (see Akten, 2004).  Furthermore, sufficiently large numbers of conflict 
observations are necessary in order to obtain a statistically fitted distribution of maxC ′ . 
Uncertainties in the estimated parameters of the distributions proposed in Section 3.2.2 
could be reduced with increased number of observations. Based on a preliminary 
analysis, traffic movement data of four hour time periods in day and night conditions 
are taken for the analysis. 
 
Traffic movement data, obtained from the Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) 
database of Singapore port, are analyzed to measure risks of collision in waterways. 
This data include vessels’ positions in coordinates, speeds, headings, and their numeric 
identities. The kinematic information is usually updated at time intervals of few 
seconds depending on traffic characteristics, thus the data provides detailed trajectories 
of vessels. An initial challenge in using the data was to unscramble the VTIS system 
data as the data is stored in a compact format, which is unrecognized by general 
computers. A computer program was developed to unscramble the VTIS system data 
into a computer readable format. Using the developed program, a database of vessels’ 
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trajectories is obtained in which the trajectories are chronologically listed in segments 
of update cycles. The structure of the unscrambled database is shown in Appendix B. 
To measure the proximity indicators of encounters and associated risks of collisions, 
another computer program is necessary for analyzing the unscrambled database. A 





































Figure 4.4 Block Diagram of Conflict Analysis 
 
The input information necessary for the analysis are the positions, speeds and bearings 
of vessels plying in and around a waterway in consideration. By utilizing the input 
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data, the proximity indicators and C(t) values are calculated for all possible vessel 
pairs in a waterway in consideration. To form the pairs, the first vessel in the first 
update-cycle segment of the database is kept as own vessel, while the rest are 
considered as target vessel one after another. 
 
Before proceeding to analysis, it is necessary to check whether any of the vessels are 
inside the waterway as the database contains vessel trajectories whole over the port 
waters. Further, it is necessary to check if the interaction between the vessels is an 
encounter which is accomplished by comparing distance between the vessels with the 
larger vessel’s SD radius. From results of a survey conducted on Singapore port pilots 
(discussed later in Section 4.4), SD radii of four vessel classes2 are presented in Table 
4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Vessel Categories and Ship Domain in Day and Night Conditions 
 
Vessel category Description SD in Day (NM) SD in Night (NM) 
VC 1 If 300≤GT≤12000 1.869 2.308 
VC 2 If 12000<GT≤20000 1.889 2.389 
VC 3 If 20000<GT≤75000 2.700 3.150 
VC 4 If GT>75000 2.947 3.316 
    NM = Nautical Mile 
 
 
For encounters involving a stationary vessel, it is important to assess whether the 
dynamic vessel is likely to hit the stationary one or not. This is because often vessels 
are anchored near fairway boundary and the fairway vessel may deliberately pass the 
anchored vessel with a small distance margin while not heading towards the anchored 
vessel. Such an encounter, which is indicated by a negative TTC, needs to be excluded 
from the analysis as it may produce false risk of collision. By considering these 
                                                 
2 Vessels of different sizes would produce different levels of risk in an interaction. In order to consider 
the effects of vessel sizes on risk of collision, it is necessary to cluster vessels in several classes. The 
classification based on Singapore port regulations is used in this research. 
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criteria, C(t) value is obtained for a vessel pair. The procedure of obtaining C(t) values 
from the proximity indicators is illustrated in the succeeding section. 
 
Following a similar analysis, the C(t) values are obtained for all vessel pairs in all the 
update-cycle segments within a time period.  
 
4.4 MEASUREMENT OF COLLISION RISK IN AN 
INTERACTION 
 
To obtain the C(t) value in an encounter, it is necessary to develop a relationship 
between the C(t) and the proximity indicators. For this purpose, an ordered probit 
model was formulated in Section 3.2.1.2. To calibrate this model, a risk perception 
survey (described in Section 3.2.1.3) was conducted on Singapore port pilots. This 
section describes the collected perception data, followed by the results of the ordered 
probit model calibration and evaluation. 
 
4.4.1 RISK PERCEPTION DATA COLLECTION 
 
A total of 160 pilots were given the survey forms. Participation was voluntary and the 
response is anonymous. A total of 70 respondents completed the survey giving a return 
rate of 44%. The age of the respondents ranges from 28 to 61 years with a mean and 
standard deviation of 43.0 years and 9.8 years respectively. The experience of the 
respondents as harbor pilot exhibits a mean and standard deviation of 11.3 years and 
10.9 years respectively, ranging from 3 months to 40 years. The wide range of age and 
experience in the sample gave quite a good representative picture of the population. 
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The collected data contains pilots’ perceived risk levels for different combinations of 
the proximity indicators. From the 70 respondents, a total of 1750 data points are 
obtained. These data are used for calibrating the ordered probit model. 
 
4.4.2 RESULTS OF MODEL CALIBRATION AND EVALUATION 
 
The ordered probit model was calibrated using the maximum likelihood method for 
each of the vessel class and separately for day and night conditions. Table 4.2 shows 
the estimated parameters and goodness-of fit statistics of all models. 
 
Table 4.2 Estimates of the Ordered Probit Model 
 
Ordered probit regression models 
VC 1 VC 2 VC 3 VC 4 
  
Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night 
Regression estimates of explanatory variables 
  DCPA (cables length)        
 Coef. 0.2660 0.2179 0.5611 0.6502 0.2641 0.2710 0.2431 0.2088 
 Std. Err. 0.0221 0.0202 0.0487 0.0523 0.0248 0.0248 0.0123 0.0117 
  Z-stat 12.01* 10.77* 11.51* 12.44* 10.65* 10.93* 19.82* 17.85* 
  TCPA (minutes)        
 Coef. 0.1168 0.0902 0.3278 0.2637 0.1151 0.1181 0.1013 0.0892 
 Std. Err. 0.0108 0.0096 0.0288 0.0230 0.0119 0.0117 0.0058 0.0056 
  Z-stat 10.80* 9.35* 11.39* 11.48* 9.70* 10.07* 17.42* 16.02* 
Thresholds 
1λ  1ˆλ  0.2716 0.3271 0.7505 1.3021 0.3212 0.5363 0.3732 0.4457 
  Std. Err. 0.1489 0.1402 0.2578 0.2364 0.1674 0.1659 0.0833 0.0808 
2λ  2λˆ  1.0468 1.2946 2.5342 3.3943 1.5432 1.8126 1.4135 1.5219 
  Std. Err. 0.1504 0.1486 0.2743 0.3088 0.1805 0.1857 0.0891 0.0898 
3λ  3λˆ  2.1088 1.9947 4.6098 5.9758 2.3581 2.7565 2.3464 2.4159 
 Std. Err. 0.1738 0.1627 0.4031 0.4776 0.2039 0.2147 0.1029 0.1027 
4λ  4λˆ  3.1519 3.0112 6.9348 8.5806 3.4408 3.9437 3.3680 3.2375 
  Std. Err. 0.2058 0.1912 0.5655 0.6476 0.2390 0.2602 0.1200 0.1154 
Summary statistics 
 # of Obs. 325 325 225 225 250 250 950 950 
)0(LL  -500.5 -518.4 -334.0 -343.3 -395.0 -395.0 -1510.9 -1505.6 
)(βLL  -378.8 -424.5 -153.9 -150.7 -300.0 -294.4 -1193.9 -1242.7 
2G  (2 df) 243.4 187.8 360.2 385.0 190.1 201.1 634.0 525.7 
 M&Z  2R 0.583 0.471 0.894 0.887 0.578 0.591 0.527 0.456 
    * significant at 99% significance level 
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The likelihood ratio statistics of all models (e.g., 243.4 and 187.8 for VC1-Day and 
VC1-Night models respectively) are well above the critical value for significance at 
99% level of significance, which implies that the models have reasonable good fit. The 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 values (e.g., 0.58 and 0.47 for VC1-Day and VC1-Night 
models respectively) also indicate sufficient predictive power for all models. 
 
Both DCPA and TCPA show significant positive association with the latent variable in 
all models (e.g., for VC1-Day model: DCPAβ  = 0.27, p < 0.001; TCPAβ  = 0.12, p < 
0.001). This indicates that collision risk decreases if DCPA and TCPA increase.  
 
Table 4.3 Estimated Risk Level Probabilities and Collision Risks (at DCPA = 1 
cable length, TCPA = 2 minutes) 
 
Day Night 








VHR HR MR LR SAFE 
Col. 
risk VHR HR MR LR SAFE 
Col. 
risk 
VC1 0.4099 0.2981 0.2383 0.0498 0.0040 0.858 0.4716 0.3433 0.1298 0.0507 0.0045 0.869 
VC2 0.3205 0.5857 0.0935 0.0003 0.0000 0.902 0.5495 0.4372 0.0133 0.0000 0.0000 0.928 
VC3 0.4313 0.4216 0.1159 0.0296 0.0016 0.887 0.5116 0.3925 0.0836 0.0120 0.0003 0.900 
VC4 0.4711 0.3623 0.1379 0.0269 0.0017 0.881 0.5233 0.3484 0.1070 0.0191 0.0022 0.901 
VHR: Very High Risk; HR: High Risk; MR: Moderate Risk; LR: Low Risk 
 
Table 4.4 Risk Scores for Risk Levels 
 
Day  Night Vessel 
class RSHR RSMR RSLR  RSHR RSMR RSLR 
VC1 0.9138 0.6679 0.3309  0.8914 0.5701 0.3376 
VC2 0.8918 0.6346 0.3353  0.8483 0.6044 0.3036 
VC3 0.9066 0.5515 0.3147  0.8640 0.5404 0.3010 
VC4 0.8892 0.5803 0.3033  0.8623 0.5299 0.2538 
RSHR: Risk score for High Risk level; RSMR: Risk score for Moderate Risk level; RSLR: Risk score for 
Low Risk level 
 
 
By utilizing the regression estimates in Equation 3.7, risk of collision in an interaction 
can be obtained. This is illustrated for DCPA = 1 cable length and TCPA = 2 minutes, 
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as shown in Table 4.3. A comparison of the risks with the scores of the risk levels 
(presented in Table 4.4) of all models shows that the risks fall in the HR range (e.g., 
for VC1-Day model: risk = 0.86 < RSHR = 0.91), which is expected for such small 
values of DCPA and TCPA. Risks in night conditions are also found to be higher than 
those in the day, e.g., the risk in night increases by 1.3% for VC1. It is sensible to 
observe higher risk in night because of the restricted visibility and lack of visual 
perception in the night condition. 
 
4.5 MEASUREMENT OF COLLISION RISKS IN WATERWAYS 
 
By using the calibrated ordered probit model, the C(t) values are obtained for all vessel 
pairs in all the update-cycle segments. By taking the maximum of C(t) values over a 
time period (i.e., day or night periods) the corresponding maxC ′ values are extracted. 
Having extracted  values for all vessel pairs in a waterway, the PDF of  maxC ′ maxC ′  is 
obtained by examining fitness of the proposed distributions with observed values of 
. It is obtained through a two step procedure. Firstly, parameters of the proposed 
distributions are estimated by utilizing the observed data. Secondly, to find the best-




Results of the distribution fitting exercise show that a truncated gamma distribution 
consistently gives the best fit for all waterways in day and night conditions. The 
 (Equation 3.9) can then be rewritten as )( maxmax CFC ′′
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′ −×Γ−+=′ ∫ 1max 1010max  (4.1) 
 
where a and b are the estimated shape and scale parameters of the gamma distribution 
respectively; θ  is the threshold parameter representing the truncation value (= 1). A 
PDF for a typical set of  was shown in Figure 3.4. maxC ′
 
Having estimated the parameters in )( maxmax CFC ′′ , risk of collision is measured for all 
waterways in day and night conditions. In this research, the thresholds of serious 
conflicts for the four vessel classes are defined based on the specifications of the risk 
levels used in the proposed scale of perceived collision risk in an interaction. Since a 
serious conflict coincides with the transition from the High Risk level to Very High 
Risk level, the risk scores of the former level are employed to obtain the thresholds as 
( )HRRS−11 . By utilizing the thresholds (presented in Table 4.5) in Equation 3.11, 
risks of collision in the waterways are computed. 
 
Table 4.5 Thresholds for Separating Serious and Non-Serious Conflicts 
 
Vessel Category Day Night 
VC 1 11.6049 9.2057 
VC 2 9.2402 6.5898 
VC 3 10.7123 7.3535 
VC 4 9.0247 7.2630 
 
 
The probability of a serious conflict in the fairways is found to vary from 1 in 1 000 
000 to 5 in 1 000 encounters in the day condition, while that in the night vary from 1 in 
10 000 to 2 in 100 encounters. In the anchorages, the probability varies from 8 in 100 
000 000 to 1 in 100 in the day condition, and 1 in 100 000 to 3 in 100 in the night 
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condition. At the intersections, the probability ranges from 8 in 100 000 to 1 in 1 000 
and 2 in 1 000 to 7 in 1 000 in the day and night conditions respectively. 
 
Measured risks show that the probability of serious conflict per encounter is higher in 
night condition, compared to day. In daytime, because of better visibility pilots can 
readily judge speeds, distances between vessels and even any change of courses in 
order to perceive risk of collision and mitigate it. On the other hand, in nighttime they 
need to rely on navigational lights, which could make the perception-mitigation 
process difficult. This may lead vessels to come closer before taking any evasive 
actions, resulting in higher collision risks in night. 
 
Measured risks could be employed to compare safety in different waterways and time 
periods. To further extract meaningful inferences from the risks, measured values for 
different navigational scenarios can be compared to evaluate safety at those scenarios. 
For example, if one is interested in evaluating safety in a waterway before and after 
some changes in its physical or regulatory characteristics, then it can be accomplished 
by comparing the measured risks for the two scenarios. Modern navigational facilities 
(e.g., Full-bridge simulator, Electronic chart display and information system simulator) 
could be useful for such a before-and-after study. 
 
4.6 MODEL VALIDATION 
 
To validate the risk measurement model, correlations between the measured risks and 
the perceived risks in the waterways for day and night conditions are evaluated. For 
this purpose, the perception survey (described in Section 3.2.3.1) was conducted on 
Singapore port pilots in order to collect pilots’ perceived risks in the waterways. The 
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respondents of this survey and those of the ‘perception survey on collision risk in an 
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Figure 4.6 Correlations between Measured Risks and Perceived Risks in 
Anchorages 
 
The correlations between the measured risks and the average perceived risks in the 
fairways, anchorages and intersections are shown graphically in Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6 
and Figure 4.7 respectively. Results show that the PRMR,ρ  values for day and night 
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conditions in the fairways are 0.74 (p = 0.002) and 0.68 (p = 0.006) respectively. For 
anchorages, the coefficients are found as 0.81 (p = 0.008) and 0.74 (p = 0.022) in day 
and night conditions respectively. The corresponding coefficients for intersections are 
found as 0.85 (p = 0.068) and 0.83 (p = 0.079). The reasonably high correlations with 
acceptable statistical significance imply that the risk measurement model is valid for 
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The proposed risk measurement was illustrated and validated by using Singapore port 
data. The illustrative results were presented in this chapter. 
 
To illustrate the risk measurement model, traffic movement data of Singapore port 
were collected and prepared. Using these data risk of collision in an interaction was 
measured by employing an ordered probit model. Calibration results of the ordered 
probit model showed reasonable goodness-of-fit and predictive power. By utilizing the 
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measured collision risks in all interactions in a waterway collectively, the risk of 
collision in the waterway was measured. To assess the validity of the risk measurement 
model, correlations between the measured risks and those perceived by pilots were 
evaluated. Results indicated that the model is valid and could be used for measuring or 
comparing the levels of collision risks in different waterways. It also indicated that a 
useful alternative of the historical collision data is the traffic conflicts.  
 CHAPTER FIVE 






To develop a model for predicting collision risks in waterways, a Binomial Logistic 
Model (BLM) with considerations for hierarchical data structure was developed in 
Chapter 3. In this chapter, the modeling technique is illustrated for Singapore port 
waterways. Following a description of the input datasets of the models for different 
waterway types (i.e., fairways, anchorages and intersections), model calibration and 
evaluation results are presented. Based on the model estimates, the significant 
explanatory variables are identified and discussed before providing a summary of the 
chapter. 
 
5.2 DATASET FOR ANALYSIS 
 
To calibrate the BLM, the measured collision risks in fairways, anchorages and 
intersections of Singapore port (presented in Chapter 4) are used as response variable. 
Separate datasets are prepared for the three types of waterways. The explanatory 
variables include the geometric, traffic and regulatory control characteristics of the 
waterways and a time indicator. These data are collected from various sources, such as 
navigational charts, tables and the Singapore port traffic database. The explanatory 
variables of the model for fairways, anchorages and intersections are discussed in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
Chapter Five: Calibration and Evaluation of Risk Prediction Model 
5.2.1 FAIRWAYS 
 
A total of 20 explanatory variables, which are hypothesized to relate to risk of collision 
in fairway, are considered in the model. A correlation matrix of the variables is 
examined to identify and avoid multi-collinearity. For the highly correlated variables, 
only the most significant variable is retained in the analysis. Through this process, 
three correlated variables are omitted from the dataset. The definitions of the 
remaining variables, together with their means and standard deviations (S.D.), are 
presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of Explanatory Variables in Fairway Model 
 
Explanatory variables Description Mean S.D. 
Fairway characteristics    
   Fairway boundary    
      Shoreline 1 if present, else 0 0.200 0.407 
      Intersection 1 if present, else 0 0.600 0.498 
      Anchorage 1 if present, else 0 0.733 0.450 
      Confined water 1 if present, else 0 0.667 0.479 
      Local fairway 1 if present, else 0 0.867 0.346 
      International fairway 1 if present, else 0 0.400 0.498 
   Water depth Controlling water depth of navigation (meters) 17.987 9.078 
   Fairway width Average width of fairway (meters) 1224.171 693.810 
   Degree of bend Cumulative fairway centerline deflections (degrees) 35.200 34.098 
   Pilot B/D ground 1 if present, else 0 0.400 0.498 
   Traffic separation scheme 1 if present, else 0 0.133 0.346 
   Cardinal mark Number of cardinal marks 0.933 1.552 
   Isolated danger mark Number of isolated danger marks 0.133 0.346 
Traffic characteristics    
   Dynamic ship density Avg. dynamic ship density in fairway (ships/sq NM) 1.714 1.206 
   Stationary ship density Avg. stationary ship density in fairway (ships/sq NM) 1.016 1.565 
   Operating speed Average operating speed in fairway (knots) 6.097 3.586 
Time variable    
   Day/Night 1 if night, 0 if day 0.500 0.509 
 
 
Since risk of collision in a fairway is likely to be influenced by traffic in its boundary 
waters, it is necessary to consider the boundary effects. The waters around a fairway 
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are described by six types of boundaries, such as shoreline, intersection, anchorage, 
confined water, local fairway and international fairway. Confined waters comprise the 
port terminal berth areas and the low depth waters with scattered land obstacles. The 
fairways inside port waters are referred to as local fairway, while those outside port 
waters are referred to as international fairways. The others are defined according to 
their standard definitions. The boundary waters are defined as binary variables in the 
model based on their presence. 
 
Geometric characteristics of fairways include the water depth of navigation, average 
navigable width, the degree of bend (described by the sum of all angular deflection 
from a straight line extended from the straight fairway section prior to a bend), the 
presence of pilot boarding/disembarkation ground, the type of traffic (one-way or both 
way) and whether the traffic separation scheme (TSS) is enforced. Pilot 
boarding/disembarkation grounds are defined as the waters used by pilots to board or 
disembark an ocean-going vessel. Presence of TSS represents if traffic streams in a 
fairway are separated by some between space margins. Due to multi-collinearity, the 
type of traffic is omitted from the analysis. 
 
Characteristics of navigational aids (e.g., navigational buoys/lights) in fairways are 
represented by four types of such facilities, as specified in the IALA Maritime 
Buoyage System (IALA, 1980). The types include lateral mark, cardinal mark, isolated 
danger mark and safe water mark. A lateral mark is used to indicate the navigation 
channels, particularly to distinguish the preferred channel at the points where a channel 
divides. A cardinal mark indicates the deepest water side around the mark. An isolated 
danger mark is used to indicate danger of small area which has navigable water all 
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around it. A safe water mark is used particularly to represent mid channel or landfall 
marks, where navigable waters are present all around the mark. Lateral marks are 
represented based on their presence, while the others are described as the number of 
marks present in fairways. Due to multi-collinearity, the lateral mark and the safe 
water mark variables are omitted. 
 
Traffic characteristics of fairways are obtained from the vessel traffic information 
system database of Singapore port. These include traffic densities, and operating 
speeds of the fairways. Traffic density is described as the average number of dynamic 
vessels per square nautical mile and the average number of stationary vessels per 
square nautical mile, while operating speed represents the average speed of vessels 
navigating in fairways. The average values are obtained for both the day and night 
situations. Furthermore, to account for the effects of differences in navigational 





A total of 15 explanatory variables, which are hypothesized to relate to risk of collision 
in anchorage, are considered in the model. Among these variables, three are omitted 
from the dataset due to multi-collinearity. The definitions of the remaining variables, 
together with their means and standard deviations (S.D.), are presented in Table 5.2. 
 
The waters around an anchorage are described by five types, such as shoreline, 
intersection, confined water, local fairway and international fairway, which are defined 
as binary variables in the model based on their presence. Since local fairway and 
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confined water are found to be highly correlated, the former one is not considered in 
the analysis. 
 
Geometric characteristics include the controlling water depth of navigation, presence 
of pilot boarding/disembarkation ground and the ratio of area to perimeter of 
anchorage. The area-perimeter ratio is preliminarily considered to examine if there is 
any effect of anchorage shape on collision risk, but it is omitted due to multi-
collinearity. In addition, the variable representing presence of pilot 
boarding/disembarkation ground is omitted from the analysis. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of Explanatory Variables in Anchorage Model 
 
Explanatory variables Description Mean S.D. 
Anchorage characteristics    
   Anchorage boundary    
      Shoreline 1 if present, else 0 0.667 0.485 
      Intersection 1 if present, else 0 0.667 0.485 
      Confined water 1 if present, else 0 0.333 0.485 
      International fairway 1 if present, else 0 0.667 0.485 
   Water depth Controlling water depth of navigation 
(meters) 
16.389 4.164 
   Cardinal mark Number of cardinal marks 0.333 0.970 
   Isolated danger mark Number of isolated danger marks 0.333 0.485 
   Traffic characteristics    
      Dynamic ship density Avg. dynamic ship density in anchorage 
(ships/sq NM) 
1.194 0.818 
      Stationary ship density Avg. stationary ship density in anchorage 
(ships/sq NM) 
2.693 2.257 
      Operating speed Average operating speed in anchorage (knots) 2.419 2.032 
Time variable    
   Day/Night 1 if night, 0 if day 0.500 0.514 
 
 
Characteristics of navigational aids are represented by cardinal mark, isolated danger 
mark and safe water mark. Due to multi-collinearity, the safe water mark variable is 
omitted. 
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Traffic characteristics include the average density of dynamic ships, the average 
density of stationary ships and the mean operating speed in anchorages. A binary 
variable indicating day and night time is also considered to represent the navigational 




A total of 12 explanatory variables, which are hypothesized to relate to risk of collision 
in intersections, are considered in the model. Five of these variables are omitted from 
the analysis due to multi-collinearity. The definitions of the remaining variables, 
together with their means and standard deviations (S.D.), are presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Summary of Explanatory Variables in Intersection Model 
 
Explanatory variables Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Intersection characteristics    
   Intersection boundary    
      Anchorage 1 if present, else 0 0.600 0.516 
      Confined water 1 if present, else 0 0.600 0.516 
   Lateral mark 1 if present, else 0 0.400 0.516 
   Cardinal mark Number of cardinal marks 0.400 0.516 
Traffic characteristics    
   Dynamic ship density Avg. dynamic ship density in intersection (ships/sq NM) 1.522 1.130 
   Operating speed Average operating speed in intersection (knots) 7.065 0.675 
Time variable    
   Day/Night 1 if night, 0 if day 0.500 0.527 
 
 
The boundary waters of an intersection are described by three types, such as 
anchorage, confined water and international fairway, which are defined as binary 
variables in the model based on their presence. Due to multi-collinearity, the 
international fairway variable is not considered in the analysis. 
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Geometric characteristics of an intersection include the controlling water depth of 
navigation, proportion of two-way approaches and proportion of approaches attributing 
traffic separation scheme. However, the variables are subjected to the problem of 
multi-collinearity. 
 
Characteristics of navigational aids are represented by lateral mark, cardinal mark, and 
precautionary mark. A precautionary mark in an intersection is considered to be 
present if the intersection is marked with a precautionary sign on navigation chart, 
while the others follow the previously stated definitions. Due to multi-collinearity, the 
precautionary mark variable is not considered in the analysis. 
 
Traffic characteristics include the average density of dynamic ships and the mean 
operating speed in intersections. In addition, a binary variable representing day and 
night periods is considered to represent the navigational characteristics in the time 
periods. 
 
5.3 RESULTS OF MODEL CALIBRATION AND EVALUATION 
 
The parameters of the BLM were derived using the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. To avoid excess complexity in the model as the large set of explanatory 
variables used, the correlations among observations within a waterway panel were 
modeled using the modified sandwich variance matrix approach, as explained in 
Section 3.3.2.2.  
 
Starting with a saturated model that includes the full set of explanatory variables, a 
backward elimination procedure was employed to obtain the most parsimonious model 
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by minimizing the value of AIC. The insignificant variables were omitted one after 
another starting with the most insignificant one. Estimates of the BLM along with the 
fitness statistics for the fairway, anchorage and intersection models are presented in 
Table 5.4, Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 respectively. 
 
Table 5.4 BLM Estimates of Collision Risks in Fairways 
 
Effect estimates Explanatory variables 
Coefficient S.E. 
Odds ratio Z-stat P-value 
Fairway characteristics      
   Fairway boundary      
      Shoreline 3.0292 0.2905 20.681 10.43 0.000 
      Intersection 1.1429 0.1526 3.136 7.49 0.000 
      Confined water -1.5875 0.2889 0.204 -5.50 0.000 
      Local fairway -1.8804 0.1479 0.153 -12.71 0.000 
      International fairway 3.7602 0.2785 42.956 13.50 0.000 
   Water depth -0.1308 0.0121 0.877 -10.78 0.000 
   Degree of bend 0.0101 0.0012 1.010 8.55 0.000 
   Cardinal mark 0.1445 0.0399 1.155 3.62 0.000 
   Isolated danger mark 1.6545 0.2819 5.230 5.87 0.000 
Traffic characteristics      
   Dynamic ship density 0.4412 0.1479 1.555 2.98 0.003 
   Stationary ship density -0.3595 0.1999 0.698 -1.80 0.072 
   Operating speed -0.1641 0.0218 0.849 -7.54 0.000 
Time variable      
   Day/Night 2.2992 0.3357 9.966 6.85 0.000 
Model statistics      
   Intercept -7.7939 0.8197  -9.51 0.000 
   Log-likelihood (null) -156.375     
   Log-likelihood (model) -34.032     
   Likelihood ratio statistics 244.686     
   Adj. LL ratio index 0.693     
   AIC 96.064     
   Dispersion parameter 0.513     
 
 
The resulting BLM yields AIC value of 96.1 (fairway), 63.9 (anchorage) and 32.9 
(intersection). The corresponding values of the dispersion statistics are 0.51, 0.83 and 
0.22 respectively, which indicate that adjustments to the standard errors are not 
necessary. The likelihood ratio statistics of the models (fairway: 244.7, p < 0.001; 
anchorage: 231.3, p < 0.001; intersection: 20.8, p < 0.001) are well above their critical 
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values for significance at 95% level of significance, which implies that the models 
have reasonably good fit. The adjusted log-likelihood ratio index values for the 
fairway, anchorage and intersection models (0.69, 0.77 and 0.21 respectively) also 
indicate that the models have sufficient explanatory and predictive power. 
 
Table 5.5 BLM Estimates of Collision Risks in Anchorages 
 
Effect estimates Explanatory variables 
Coefficient S.E. 
Odds 
ratio Z-stat P-value 
Anchorage characteristics      
   Anchorage boundary      
      Shoreline 5.5156 0.4307 248.543 12.80 0.000 
      Confined water -5.5356 0.4768 0.004 -11.61 0.000 
      International fairway 3.8023 0.4997 44.803 7.61 0.000 
   Isolated danger mark -4.3017 0.6901 0.014 -6.23 0.000 
   Traffic characteristics      
      Operating speed -0.4991 0.1689 0.607 -2.95 0.003 
Time variable      
   Day/Night 2.0819 0.8520 8.020 2.44 0.015 
Model statistics      
   Intercept -9.8153 0.6148  -15.96 0.000 
   Log-likelihood (null) -140.621     
   Log-likelihood (model) -24.962     
   Likelihood ratio statistics 231.318     
   Adj. LL ratio index 0.773     
   AIC 63.924     
   Dispersion parameter 0.825     
 
 
Table 5.4, Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 also show the significant explanatory variables that 
are strongly associated with risk of collision in the three types of waterways. On 
fairways, the presence of shoreline, intersection, confined water, local fairway and 
international fairway at fairway boundary, water depth, degree of bend, number of 
cardinal mark and isolated danger mark, density of dynamic ships, operating speed 
and night time are found to be significant. For anchorages, the presence of shoreline, 
confined water and international fairway at anchorage boundary, number of isolated 
danger mark, operating speed and night time are found to be significantly associated 
with collision risk. At intersections, presence of anchorage at intersection boundary, 
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presence of lateral mark, number of cardinal mark, operating speed and night time are 
found to be significant. 
 
Table 5.6 BLM Estimates of Collision Risks at Intersections 
 
Effect estimates Explanatory variables 
Coefficient S.E. 
Odds ratio Z-stat P-value 
Intersection characteristics      
   Intersection boundary      
      Anchorage 0.4578 0.0672 1.581 6.81 0.000 
   Lateral mark -0.7526 0.3297 0.471 -2.28 0.022 
   Cardinal mark 0.4716 0.1476 1.603 3.20 0.001 
Traffic characteristics      
   Operating speed -0.1405 0.0357 0.869 -3.93 0.000 
Time variable      
   Day/Night 1.7180 0.3184 5.573 5.40 0.000 
Model statistics      
   Intercept -6.4324 0.5852  -10.99 0.000 
   Log-likelihood (null) -20.840     
   Log-likelihood (model) -10.429     
   Likelihood ratio statistics 20.822     
   Adj. LL ratio index 0.212     
   AIC 32.858     
   Dispersion parameter 0.221     
 
 
The odds ratios of the significant variables are presented in respective tables of the 
waterway types, and discussed in the succeeding section. 
 
5.4 DISCUSSION ON SIGNIFICANT EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
 
Presence of Shoreline at Waterway Boundary 
Risk of collision is found to be significantly associated with presence of shoreline at 
fairway boundary (beta = 3.03, p < 0.001) and at anchorage boundary (beta = 5.52, p < 
0.001). In fairways, the odds of a serious conflict are 19.7 times higher if it is attached 
to shoreline. This type of fairways are usually narrower and likely to have land 
activities (e.g., terminals, berths) along the shoreline, which could further reduce the 
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effective navigational width of the fairways. Pilots may have less flexibility in taking 
evasive actions in these narrow fairways because navigating closer to shoreline will 
increase the risk of grounding. Risk of collision could be higher due to the reduced 
flexibility in maneuvering. On the other hand, anchorages attached to shoreline shows 
247 times higher odds of a serious conflict. Vessels have restricted access to this type 
of anchorages due to the presence of shoreline. Hence, vessels anchored near the 
shoreline need to navigate through the other anchored vessels in order to move out of 
the anchorage. This implies greater interaction between vessels and, possibly, more 
conflicts. 
 
Presence of Intersection at Fairway Boundary 
Intersection attached to fairways shows significant positive effect (beta = 1.14, p < 
0.001) on collision risks in fairways with 214% higher odds of a serious conflict. 
Number of vessel movements is high in these waters as vessels from different fairways 
approach towards intersection for crossing purpose. Risk of collision could rise due to 
the cross traffic interactions. 
 
Presence of Anchorage at Intersection Boundary 
Risk of collision at intersections attached to anchorages are found to be increased (beta 
= 0.46, p < 0.001), correspondingly increasing the odds of a serious conflict by 58%. 
While the numbers of crossing interactions are high in the intersections, other types of 
traffic interactions (e.g., merging, diverging) are also very common in such waters. 
Safety can be improved by providing dedicated navigational management service, such 
as monitoring and assisting pilots by providing relevant information regarding vessels 
plying in such waters so that pilots can better manage the complicated interactions. 
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Presence of Confined Water at Waterway Boundary 
Risk of collision is found to be decreased in the fairways (beta = -1.59, p < 0.001) and 
the anchorages (beta = -5.54, p < 0.001) bounded by confined water. Results show that 
the corresponding odds of a non-serious conflict are 4.9 times higher in fairways, 
whereas in anchorages it is 250 times higher. Confined water characterizes low density 
and slow speed vessel movements in the berth areas, and only the small vessels (e.g., 
pilot boats, speed boats) operate in the low depth waters. For these reasons, risks in 
attached fairways and anchorages could be lower. 
 
Presence of International Fairway at Waterway Boundary 
Risk of collision significantly increases if an international fairway is present at fairway 
boundary (beta = 3.76, p < 0.001) and at anchorage boundary (beta = 3.8, p < 0.001). 
Pilot boarding/disembarkation grounds are usually located near the international 
fairways. These grounds are used by pilots to go onboard the vessels calling to port or 
to disembark the vessels intending to leave the port. The boarding and disembarkation 
process is a safety critical event in navigation (SOLAS, 1974) and it often requires 
vessels to slacken speeds for making the process safer. This speed reduction could 
impede the through traffic in international fairways and, possibly, result in more 
number of conflicts. In addition, interactions of pilot boats with the existing traffic may 
pose additional risk of collision. Results show that the odds of a serious conflict are 
about 42 times and 44 times higher if international fairway is present at fairway 
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Presence of Local Fairway at Fairway Boundary 
The presence of local fairway shows significant negative effect on collision risks in 
fairways (beta = -1.88, p < 0.001) with a corresponding decrease of 84.7% in the odds 
of a serious conflict. Two local fairways can be attached if there is no intersections 
between them and the fairways differ only in their geometric and/or regulatory control 
characteristics (e.g., width, presence of TSS). While the presence of an intersection 
increases collision risks in fairways (shown earlier), its absence will reduce the risks as 
no cross traffic interactions take place in such waters. 
 
Controlling Water Depth of Navigation 
The navigable water depth is found to have a negative association (beta = -0.13, p < 
0.001) with collision risks in fairways. This result is expected because pilots do not 
need to worry about under keel clearance, squat effects, or monitoring echo-sounder 
while navigating in deeper waters, which may allow taking risk mitigating actions at 
an early stage. Debnath and Chin (2009) have also reported that perceived risks 
decrease if water depth is higher. 
 
Degrees of Bend 
Increasing degrees of deflection is found to positively influence (beta = 0.01, p < 
0.001) collision risks in fairways. This finding is consistent with that of Roeleven et al. 
(1995) who reported that decreasing bend radius (i.e., increasing degree of deflection) 
gives rise to the probability of collision. Debnath and Chin (2009) have also reported 
that pilots perceive higher risks in fairways having sharper bends. This is generally 
expected as vessels need larger navigation room for course alteration in case of sharper 
bends (Sarioz et al., 2000) and traffic interactions are more complicated at bends, 
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compared to straight sections. Furthermore, rear and forward views could be restricted 
prior to and during course alternation at bends due to presence of land obstacles, which 
could impede the timely evasive action taking process. Interestingly results show that 
the odds of a serious conflict increases by 1% for a unit increment in degree of 
deflection. While this may be obvious, increasing sight distance by managing land 
obstacles could improve safety at bends. 
 
Lateral Mark 
Presence of lateral mark significantly reduces collision risks at intersections (beta = -
0.75, p = 0.022) with 52.9% lower odds of a serious conflict. Lateral mark indicates 
the boundary of navigation channel which may help the pilots to form queues in a safer 
manner while approaching an intersection. 
 
Cardinal Mark 
The number of cardinal mark is found to have positive association with collision risks 
both in fairways (beta = 0.14, p < 0.001) and at intersections (beta = 0.47, p = 0.001), 
correspondingly increasing the odds of a serious conflict by 16% and 60% 
respectively. A cardinal mark is used to indicate the deepest water side (i.e., safe side 
to pass a danger) around the mark. It is also used to mark the locations featuring a 
bend, an intersection or a bifurcation (MPA, 2006). Risks of collision in these 
locations are usually high, which may be a reason of observing the positive association 
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Isolated Danger Mark 
The number of isolated danger mark is found to have significant association with 
collision risks in fairways (beta = 1.65, p < 0.001) and anchorages (beta = -4.30, p < 
0.001). An isolated danger mark increases the odds of a serious conflict by 423% in 
fairways, whereas in anchorages the odds decrease by 98.6%. The difference in the 
effects of isolated danger mark could be due to the fact that operating speed is higher 
in fairways. At high speed, it is necessary to take risk mitigating actions at an early 
stage. Failing to do so may increase the risk of collision. In addition, pilots need to take 
care of avoiding danger of grounding at locations marked by the marks, which may 
further influence collision risk positively. On the other hand, vessels operate at lower 
speeds in anchorages, thus allowing earlier risk mitigating actions. At low speed, it is 
also easier to guide vessels on a planned track.  
 
Density of Dynamic Ships 
The risk of collision in a fairway increases with increased density of dynamic ships 
(beta = 0.44, p = 0.003). Results show that the odds of a serious conflict increase by 
55.5% for a unit increment in the density. This result is expected because increased 
density implies greater interaction between vessels and possibly results in more multi-
vessel conflicts. Risk of collision will therefore increase because of greater exposure. 
 
Operating Speed 
Operating speed shows significant negative association with collision risk in all 
waterway types. An increase of 1 knot reduces the odds of a serious conflict by 15.1% 
in fairways (beta = -0.16, p < 0.001), 39.3% in anchorages (beta = -0.50, p = 0.003) 
and 13.1% at intersections (beta = -0.14, p < 0.001). The result can be explained by the 
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fact that in order to take evasive actions, pilots may slacken speed while being 
involved in an encounter producing significant collision risk. For this reason, the 
negative association could be observed. 
 
Time Effects 
Risk of collision is found to be higher in night condition for all waterway types: 
fairways (beta = 2.30, p < 0.001), anchorages (beta = 2.08, p = 0.015) and intersections 
(beta = 1.72, p < 0.001). Results show that the corresponding odds of a serious conflict 
in fairways, anchorages and intersections are 9.0, 7.0 and 4.6 times higher, than in the 
day condition. This could be because during the day the speeds, distances between 
vessels and even any change of courses can be judged readily than at the night. At 
nighttime, pilots need to rely on navigational aids (e.g., radar, navigational lights), 
which makes the risk perception and mitigation process difficult. Furthermore, 
naturally visibility deteriorates at night which could hinder the watchkeeping process 
leading to confusions in navigation. Effectiveness of navigational lights can also be 
reduced at night due to bright background lights on shore and from nearby islands 
(Akten, 2004; C.-P. Liu et al., 2006). A number of studies (Chin and Debnath, 2009; 





A traffic-conflict-based modeling technique for predicting collision risks in port 
waterways (presented in Chapter 3) was illustrated for Singapore port waterways in 
this chapter. A BLM of collision risks in different types of waterways, i.e., fairways, 
anchorages and intersections were separately calibrated and evaluated for this purpose. 
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All three models showed reasonable goodness-of-fit and sufficient explanatory and 
predictive power. The BLM also identified several significant relationships between 
collision risks and the geometric, traffic and regulatory control characteristics of 
waterways. Results imply that for predicting collision risk in a waterway, the 
developed modeling technique can be employed effectively. Results also indicate that 
a predictive model of collision risk can be obtained by using traffic conflicts as an 
alternative to the traditional collision-data-based approach. 
 
 CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
A summary of the research findings, conclusions and recommendations for future 
research are presented in this final chapter. 
 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
 
Traditionally collision data are used to assess the level of collision risk and to 
investigate the causes and trends of collisions in port waters. Since a large number of 
collision observations are necessary in order to obtain statistically sound inferences 
from analysis of collision records, risk modeling relying on collision data is often 
hampered by low number of observations. This collision-data-based modeling 
approach is also an unethical and reactive approach to safety because of its reliance on 
collision data.  
 
To overcome these problems, this research aimed to explore the use of non-collision 
information in modeling collision risks in port waters. Traffic conflicts were 
innovatively proposed as an alternative to the collisions and use of the conflicts in 
collision risk modeling was explored by developing mathematical models for 
measuring and predicting the risks. The models proved that traffic conflicts are a 
useful alternative of the collisions and port water collision risks can be evaluated in a 
fast, reliable and efficient manner by using the conflicts.  
 
Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The traffic-conflict-based approach has a great potential in navigational safety 
discipline. This approach allows safety analysts to diagnose safety deficiencies in a 
proactive manner, which, consequently, has potential for managing collision risks 
efficiently. It also provides safety analysts an ethically appealing alternative to the 
traditional collision-data-based approach for fast, reliable and proactive safety 
evaluation. 
 
The modeling techniques of the developed models for measuring and predicting risks 
were illustrated for Singapore port waters. Summaries of the two models are presented 
in the subsequent sections. 
 
6.1.1 RISK MEASUREMENT MODEL 
 
To measure the level of collision risk in a waterway, this research innovatively 
developed a risk measurement model that measures collision risk by analyzing traffic 
conflicts. Results of an illustrative example of the modeling technique proved that the 
model can be used effectively for measurement of collision risks. 
 
In formulation of the risk measurement model, a two step procedure was employed. In 
the first step, collision risk in an interaction was measured by developing a quantitative 
measure of conflicts. An ordered probit model was developed for this purpose, where 
collision risk in an interaction was modeled as a function of two proximity indicators 
representing the spatial and temporal closeness between a pair of vessels. In the second 
step, a method for measuring risk of collision in a waterway was developed that 
statistically characterizes the measured risks for all interactions in a waterway. Several 
statistical distributions including the negative exponential, gamma, weibull, lognormal 
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and loglogistic were employed for this purpose. Anderson Darling test was employed 
to examine the goodness of fit of the distributions. To validate the risk measurement 
model, a framework was developed that evaluates the correlations between the 
measured risks and those perceived by pilots. 
 
Using traffic movement data of Singapore port waterways, the illustrative results 
showed that the risk measurement model is valid. Pearson correlation coefficients of 
0.74 (p = 0.002) and 0.68 (p = 0.006) were found between measured and perceived 
risks in fairways for day and night conditions respectively. For anchorages, the 
coefficients were found as 0.81 (p = 0.008) and 0.74 (p = 0.022) in day and night 
conditions respectively. The corresponding coefficients for intersections were found as 
0.85 (p = 0.068) and 0.83 (p = 0.079). The reasonably high correlations with 
acceptable statistical significance imply that the risk measurement model is valid for 
all of the three types of waterways. 
 
6.1.2 RISK PREDICTION MODEL 
 
To develop predictive models of collision risks in port waterways, this research 
developed a binomial logistic model (BLM) that explains the relationships between the 
measured risks (i.e., proportion of serious conflicts in encounters in a waterway) and 
the geometric, traffic and regulatory control characteristics of waterways. To account 
for the correlations in risks at different time periods in a waterway, the ordinary BLM 
is improved to properly specify the hierarchical data structure. A systematic procedure 
of evaluating the model is developed in order to assess the existence of overdispersion 
and the fitness of a best-fitted model, which is obtained through a process of model 
comparison by using Akaike information criteria. The likelihood ratio statistics and the 
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adjusted log likelihood ratio index were employed to assess the fitness and predictive 
power of the model respectively.  
 
Using the measured risks in the fairways, anchorages and intersections in Singapore 
port waters, the corresponding risk prediction models identified statistically significant 
relationships between the risks and waterway characteristics with reasonable model 
fitness. The likelihood ratio statistics of the models (fairway: 244.7, p < 0.001; 
anchorage: 231.3, p < 0.001; intersection: 20.8, p < 0.001) are well above the critical 
value for significance at 5% level of significance. It means that the models have 
reasonably good fit. The adjusted log-likelihood ratio index values for the fairway, 
anchorage and intersection models (0.69, 0.77 and 0.21 respectively) also indicate that 
the models have sufficient explanatory and predictive power. The results indicate that 
for predicting collision risks in waterways, the traffic-conflict-based modeling 
technique can be employed effectively. 
 
Results showed that the presence of shoreline, intersection and international fairway at 
fairway boundary, higher degree of bend, lower depth of water, higher numbers of 
cardinal marks and isolated danger marks, higher density of dynamic ships, lower 
operating speed, and night condition are associated with higher risks of collision in 
fairways. On the other hand, the presence of confined water and local fairway at 
fairway boundary were found to be negatively associated with collision risks in 
fairways. Risks of collision in anchorages were found to be positively associated with 
the presence of shoreline and international fairway at anchorage boundary, lower 
number of isolated danger marks, lower operating speed, and night condition. The 
presence of confined water at anchorage boundary was found to associate with lower 
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risks of collision in anchorages. At intersections, the presence of anchorage at 
intersection boundary, absence of lateral marks, higher number of cardinal marks, 
lower operating speed, and night condition were found to be positively associated with 
risks of collision at intersections. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The modeling techniques of collision risk measurement and prediction have great 
potential for future extensions as well as application for future research in navigational 
safety discipline. Three major directions are outlined in the subsequent sections. 
 
6.2.1 EXTENSIONS OF RISK MEASUREMENT MODEL 
 
While this research illustrated the modeling technique of the risk measurement model 
for the waterways in Singapore port by considering aggregate effects for day and night 
navigation conditions, the effects for smaller time intervals may also be examined. 
Examining the disaggregate effects may provide more insights into understanding the 
nature of collision risks at particular sites. However, such a study may need to take 
special considerations on choosing the time segments because a smaller time segment 
will yield a smaller number of conflict observations. This may hamper fitting the 
distribution of the observations in a sound statistical manner. A possible strategy to 
obtain a statistically fitted distribution may be by selecting time segments of unequal 
length in such a way that there is sufficient number of observations in each segment. 
 
Furthermore, the modeling technique may be applied to examine the effects of weather 
factors (e.g., tide, current, visibility) on collision risks. Again, the main difficulty in 
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such a study is to obtain a very large database of traffic movements. Since the weather 
factors follow a cyclic pattern, it is necessary to obtain movement data of a month at 
least. Besides managing such a large database, another difficulty is to obtain suitable 
time segments so that the weather factors vary over the segments. In addition, ensuring 
sufficient number of observations in each segment may lead to a more complicated 
analysis.  
 
6.2.2 EVALUATION OF BAYESIAN PRIORS IN RISK PREDICTION 
MODELING 
 
While in this research, the risk prediction modeling technique was developed in the 
classical frequentist paradigm (i.e., maximum likelihood estimation), the modeling 
technique may also be developed in the Bayesian paradigm. Inference in maximum 
likelihood estimation is based on the likelihood of the model calibration data alone, 
whereas in Bayesian models two sources of data are used: prior beliefs and the 
likelihood of model calibration data. This allows using existing information or prior 
experience combined with the observed data in prediction modeling. Use of the 
Bayesian models has acquired impressive attention of safety researchers (especially in 
the context of road traffic) in recent time. 
 
In Bayesian models, the likelihood of observed data y given parameters β  is used to 
modify the prior beliefs )(βπ and the updated knowledge is summarized as posterior 
information ( )yβπ . In case of developing a predictive model of collision risks in 
waterways, the measured (i.e., observed) risks could be used as observed data, and the 
risks in waterways perceived by pilots could be used as prior beliefs. This will provide 
a blend of expert judgments and observed traffic data in explaining the relationships 
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between the observed risks and the geometric, traffic and regulatory control 
characteristics of waterways. 
 
This arrangement of prior beliefs and observed data will also allow using ‘informative’ 
priors in Bayesian modeling. In general, ‘non-informative’ or ‘flat’ priors have been 
used in road traffic safety research because of the absence of any existing knowledge. 
Using expert judgments as prior beliefs would relax this constraint and may 
significantly improve model fitness and predictive power. 
 
6.2.3 USE OF PERCEPTUAL MODELS IN COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
 
To develop a relationship between the risk of collision in an interaction and the 
proximity indicators (i.e., DCPA and TCPA), this research derived an ordered probit 
model. By utilizing risks perceived by pilots, it was calibrated to obtain perceptual 
models of pilots. These perceptual models have great potential to be applied in 
collision avoidance. 
 
In the traditional arrangement of collision avoidance, pilots assess and mitigate 
collision risk by combining data obtained from collision avoidance systems (CAS) 
with information obtained by visual watch-keeping. The most widely CAS used on 
most merchant vessels is the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA). It allows pilots to 
track a number of target vessels within the radar detection range and triggers alarms to 
alert the pilots of collision risk. In the ARPA system, collision risk is treated as a 
discrete variable. However, to better help pilots in decision making in encounters, 
collision risk should be considered as a continuous variable. Furthermore, as the 
performance and judgment in encounter vary from one pilot to another, it is also 
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necessary to consider the probabilistic aspects of defining risk. Moreover, other factors 
such as vessel size and the environment play an important role in influencing 











Figure 6.1 Block Diagram of Collision Avoidance System 
 
To overcome the identified limitations of the existing CAS, the ordered probit model 
developed in this research could be useful. Results of the model calibration and 
evaluation showed that the calibrated models have reasonable predictive power. This 
implies that the regression estimates can be used effectively to develop a CAS. A 
framework of risk assessment in CAS that utilizes the estimates to predict collision risk 
in an interaction is proposed (see Figure 6.1) and discussed in detail in Chin and 
Debnath (2009). By assessing collision risk probabilistically, this framework produces 
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alarms for different levels of risk. It also enables prioritizing interacting vessels 
according to the level of risk involved. Following the proposed framework, a real-time 
CAS can be developed and its effectiveness in collision avoidance can be evaluated in 
future research.  
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This appendix presents the risk perception survey form indicated in Chapter 3. 
 
Harbor Pilot Perception Survey on Collision risk 
We, researchers of the National University of Singapore, are conducting this survey to 
gather information about harbor pilots’ perception of vessel collision risk in port 
waters. Findings of this survey will help researchers and engineers to examine such 
risk and mitigate it. Your participation is greatly appreciated. All information 
collected is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes only. 
 
 
Part A. Risk Perception of Shipping Interactions 
 
In this part, we want you to provide us your judgment of collision risk for vessel 
interactions. Please use the Risk Scale (given below) for this part. 
 
Risk Scale:  
Level of actions necessary 











No actions necessary 
Keep monitoring 1
Immediate actions needed 
Take precautionary actions, 




4 Collision imminent, cannot be avoided
Appendices 
Q1. Suppose you are involved in a two-ship interaction. The interaction is described by 
values of Distance at Closest Point of Approach (DCPA) and Time to CPA 
(TCPA). What is the Collision Risk for each set of DCPA and TCPA (given 
below in tables)? Consider average ship sizes that you operate frequently. 
 
Please fill up the tables with Risk Scores (0-4): 
During Day time navigation:    During Night time navigation: 
 
 TCPA (Minutes) 
DCPA 
(Cables) 1 3 5 10 20 
1      
2      
5      
7      
10      
 
 TCPA (Minutes) 
DCPA 
(Cables) 1 3 5 10 20 
1      
2      
5      
7      
10      
 
Q2. While channeling, usually when you would start monitoring other ships? 
Ans.: 1. At Day time: when other ships are _____ (nautical mile) away from my ship. 
          2. At Night time: when other ships are ____ (nautical mile) away from my ship. 
 
Part B. Background Information 
Please tell us about yourself: 
1. Age: _________ years. 
2. Number of years on-board as harbor pilot: _________ years. 
3. Pilot grade:  
4. Last time I did technical training (e.g., crisis management or equipment operations): 
 
5. Range of vessel tonnage that I operate: ___________ GT to ___________ GT. 
5 Never 1   1 month ago 2   2 – 6 months ago 3   6 – 12 months ago 4   Above 1 year 
  Trainee  A 2 C  B  A 3  A 1 51 2 3 4 6
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Part C. Risk Perception of Waterways 
In the last part, we want you to provide us your expert judgment about collision risk in 
several waterways of Singapore port. Please use the Risk Scale (given below) for this 
part. This scale describes collision risks according to the probability of experiencing a 
close-quarter situation (CQS) in a waterway, i.e., the chance of involving in a CQS 





















Likeliness of experiencing a close-quarter situation 
at an interaction in a waterway 
  
Q. What is the collision risk in waterways marked on the map? National U
niversity of Singapore 
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Likeliness of experiencing a CQS 







Example to fill-up:    































This appendix presents the structure of the prepared database, which contains the 




Table B.1 Structure of Database Containing Unscrambled VTIS Data 
 
  Ship's position 
Ship's 
speed Ship's attributes 
















overall Height Draft 
T 1 - - - - - - - - 
T 2 - - - - - - - - 
T 3 - - - - - - - - 
T . - - - - - - - - 
T . - - - - - - - - 
T . - - - - - - - - 
T N - - - - - - - - 
T+1 1 - - - - - - - - 
T+1 2 - - - - - - - - 
T+1 3 - - - - - - - - 
T+1 . - - - - - - - - 
T+1 . - - - - - - - - 
T+1 . - - - - - - - - 
T+1 N - - - - - - - - 
T+2 1 - - - - - - - - 
T+2 2 - - - - - - - - 
T+2 3 - - - - - - - - 
T+2 . - - - - - - - - 
T+2 . - - - - - - - - 
T+2 . - - - - - - - - 
T+2 N - - - - - - - - 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
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